Dataset Information

Exempting dissenting patients from pay for performance schemes: retrospective analysis of exception reporting in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework.

ABSTRACT:

Objective

To examine the reasons why practices exempt patients from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme (exception reporting) and to identify the characteristics of general practices associated with informed dissent.

Design

Retrospective analysis.

Setting

Data for 2008-9 extracted from the clinical computing systems of general practices in England.

Participants

8229 English family practices.

Main outcome measures

Rates of exception reporting for 37 clinical quality indicators, associations of patient and general practice factors with exception rates, and financial gain for practices relating to their use of exception reporting.

Results

The median rate of exception reporting was 2.7% (interquartile range 1.9-3.9%) overall and 0.44% (0.14-1.1%) for informed dissent, but variation in rates was wide between practices and across indicators. Common reasons for exception reporting were logistical (40.6% of exceptions), clinical contraindication (18.7%), and patient informed dissent (30.1%). Higher rates of informed dissent were associated with: higher numbers of registered patients, higher levels of local area deprivation, and failure of the practice to secure maximum remuneration in the previous year. Exception reporting increased the cost of the scheme by £30,844,500 (€36,877,700; $49,053,200) (£0.58 per patient), with two indicators accounting for a quarter of this additional cost.

Conclusions

The provision to exception report enables practices to exempt dissenting patients without being financially penalised. Relatively few patients were excluded for informed dissent, however, suggesting that the incentivised activities were broadly acceptable to patients.

SUBMITTER: Doran T

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3328418 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Similar Datasets

Project description:ObjectivesTo investigate the effect of withdrawing incentives on recorded quality of care, in the context of the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme.DesignRetrospective longitudinal study.SettingData for 644 general practices, from 2004/05 to 2011/12, extracted from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink.ParticipantsAll patients registered with any of the practices over the study period-13,772,992 in total.InterventionRemoval of financial incentives for aspects of care for patients with asthma, coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and psychosis.Main outcome measuresPerformance on eight clinical quality indicators withdrawn from a national incentive scheme: influenza immunisation (asthma) and lithium treatment monitoring (psychosis), removed in April 2006; blood pressure monitoring (coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke), cholesterol concentration monitoring (coronary heart disease, diabetes), and blood glucose monitoring (diabetes), removed in April 2011. Multilevel mixed effects multiple linear regression models were used to quantify the effect of incentive withdrawal.ResultsMean levels of performance were generally stable after the removal of the incentives, in both the short and long term. For the two indicators removed in April 2006, levels in 2011/12 were very close to 2005/06 levels, although a small but statistically significant drop was estimated for influenza immunisation. For five of the six indicators withdrawn from April 2011, no significant effect on performance was seen following removal and differences between predicted and observed scores were small. Performance on related outcome indicators retained in the scheme (such as blood pressure control) was generally unaffected.ConclusionsFollowing the removal of incentives, levels of performance across a range of clinical activities generally remained stable. This indicates that health benefits from incentive schemes can potentially be increased by periodically replacing existing indicators with new indicators relating to alternative aspects of care. However, all aspects of care investigated remained indirectly or partly incentivised in other indicators, and further work is needed to assess the generalisability of the findings when incentives are fully withdrawn.

Project description:BackgroundThe Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is an incentive scheme for general practice, which was introduced across the UK in 2004. The Quality and Outcomes Framework is one of the biggest pay for performance (P4P) scheme in the world, worth £691 million in 2016/17. We now know that P4P is good at driving some kinds of improvement but not others. In some areas, it also generated moral controversy, which in turn created conflicts of interest for providers. We aimed to undertake a meta-synthesis of 18 qualitative studies of the QOF to identify themes on the impact of the QOF on individual practitioners and other staff.MethodsWe searched 5 electronic databases, Medline, Embase, Healthstar, CINAHL and Web of Science, for qualitative studies of the QOF from the providers' perspective in primary care, published in UK between 2004 and 2018. Data was analysed using the Schwartz Value Theory as a theoretical framework to analyse the published papers through the conceptual lens of Professionalism. A line of argument synthesis was undertaken to express the synthesis.ResultsWe included 18 qualitative studies that where on the providers' perspective. Four themes were identified; 1) Loss of autonomy, control and ownership; 2) Incentivised conformity; 3) Continuity of care, holism and the caring role of practitioners' in primary care; and 4) Structural and organisational changes. Our synthesis found, the Values that were enhanced by the QOF were power, achievement, conformity, security, and tradition. The findings indicated that P4P schemes should aim to support Values such as benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and universalism, which professionals ranked highly and have shown to have positive implications for Professionalism and efficiency of health systems.ConclusionsUnderstanding how practitioners experience the complexities of P4P is crucial to designing and delivering schemes to enhance and not compromise the values of professionals. Future P4P schemes should aim to permit professionals with competing high priority values to be part of P4P or other quality improvement initiatives and for them to take on an 'influencer role' rather than being 'responsive agents'. Through understanding the underlying Values and not just explicit concerns of professionals, may ensure higher levels of acceptance and enduring success for P4P schemes.

Project description:OBJECTIVES:To characterise serum creatinine and urinary protein testing in UK general practices from 2005 to 2013 and to examine how the frequency of testing varies across demographic factors, with the presence of chronic conditions and with the prescribing of drugs for which kidney function monitoring is recommended. DESIGN:Retrospective open cohort study. SETTING:Routinely collected data from 630 UK general practices contributing to the Clinical Practice Research Datalink. PARTICIPANTS:4 573 275 patients aged over 18 years registered at up-to-standard practices between 1 April 2005 and 31 March 2013. At study entry, no patients were kidney transplant donors or recipients, pregnant or on dialysis. PRIMARY OUTCOME MEASURES:The rate of serum creatinine and urinary protein testing per year and the percentage of patients with isolated and repeated testing per year. RESULTS:The rate of serum creatinine testing increased linearly across all age groups. The rate of proteinuria testing increased sharply in the 2009-2010 financial year but only for patients aged 60 years or over. For patients with established chronic kidney disease (CKD), creatinine testing increased rapidly in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, and proteinuria testing in 2009-2010, reflecting the introduction of Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators. In adjusted analyses, CKD Read codes were associated with up to a twofold increase in the rate of serum creatinine testing, while other chronic conditions and potentially nephrotoxic drugs were associated with up to a sixfold increase. Regional variation in serum creatinine testing reflected country boundaries. CONCLUSIONS:Over a nine-year period, there have been increases in the numbers of patients having kidney function tests annually and in the frequency of testing. Changes in the recommended management of CKD in primary care were the primary determinant, and increases persist even after controlling for demographic and patient-level factors. Future studies should address whether increased testing has led to better outcomes.

Project description:BackgroundThree major hospital pay for performance (P4P) programs were introduced by the Affordable Care Act and intended to improve the quality, safety and efficiency of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. The financial risk to hospitals associated with Medicare's P4P programs is substantial. Evidence on the positive impact of these programs, however, has been mixed, and no study has assessed their combined impact. In this study, we examined the combined impact of Medicare's P4P programs on clinical areas and populations targeted by the programs, as well as those outside their focus.MethodsWe used 2007-2016 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases for 14 states to identify hospital-level inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) and patient safety indicators (PSIs), by quarter and payer (Medicare vs. non-Medicare). IQIs and PSIs are standardized, evidence-based measures that can be used to track hospital quality of care and patient safety over time using hospital administrative data. The study period of 2007-2016 was selected to capture multiple years before and after introduction of program metrics. Interrupted time series was used to analyze the impact of the P4P programs on study outcomes targeted and not targeted by the programs. In sensitivity analyses, we examined the impact of these programs on care for non-Medicare patients.ResultsMedicare P4P programs were not associated with consistent improvements in targeted or non-targeted quality and safety measures. Moreover, mortality rates across targeted and untargeted conditions were generally getting worse after the introduction of Medicare's P4P programs. Trends in PSIs were extremely mixed, with five outcomes trending in an expected (improving) direction, five trending in an unexpected (deteriorating) direction, and three with insignificant changes over time. Sensitivity analyses did not substantially alter these results.ConclusionsConsistent with previous studies for individual programs, we detect minimal, if any, effect of Medicare's hospital P4P programs on quality and safety. Given the growing evidence of limited impact, the administrative cost of monitoring and enforcing penalties, and potential increase in mortality, CMS should consider redesigning their P4P programs before continuing to expand them.

Project description:The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple case study design relying on qualitative data from 20 municipalities from two states in Northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal Primary Care Access and Quality laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivized', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivized' and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure that the choice of 'who is incentivized' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Project description:ObjectivesThe UK's Quality and Outcomes Framework permits practices to exempt patients from financially-incentivised performance targets. To better understand the determinants and consequences of being exempted from the framework, we investigated the associations between exception reporting, patient characteristics and mortality. We also quantified the proportion of exempted patients that met quality targets for a tracer condition (diabetes).DesignRetrospective longitudinal study, using individual patient data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink.Setting644 general practices, 2006/7 to 2011/12.ParticipantsPatients registered with study practices for at least one year over the study period, with at least one condition of interest (2 460 341 in total).Main outcome measuresException reporting rates by reason (clinical contraindication, patient dissent); all-cause mortality in year following exemption. Analyses with logistic and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, respectively.ResultsThe odds of being exempted increased with age, deprivation and multimorbidity. Men were more likely to be exempted but this was largely attributable to higher prevalence of conditions with high exemption rates. Modest associations remained, with women more likely to be exempted due to clinical contraindication (OR 0.90, 99% CI 0.88 to 0.92) and men more likely to be exempted due to informed dissent (OR 1.08, 99% CI 1.06 to 1.10). More deprived areas (both for practice location and patient residence) were non-linearly associated with higher exception rates, after controlling for comorbidities and other covariates, with stronger associations for clinical contraindication. Compared with patients with a single condition, odds ratios for patients with two, three, or four or more conditions were respectively 4.28 (99% CI 4.18 to 4.38), 16.32 (99% CI 15.82 to 16.83) and 68.69 (99% CI 66.12 to 71.37) for contraindication, and 2.68 (99% CI 2.63 to 2.74), 4.02 (99% CI 3.91 to 4.13) and 5.17 (99% CI 5.00 to 5.35) for informed dissent. Exempted patients had a higher adjusted risk of death in the following year than non-exempted patients, regardless of whether this exemption was for contraindication (hazard ratio 1.37, 99% CI 1.33 to 1.40) or for informed dissent (1.20, 99% CI 1.17 to 1.24). On average, quality standards were met for 48% of exempted patients in the diabetes domain, but there was wide variation across indicators (ranging from 8 to 80%).ConclusionsOlder, multimorbid and more deprived patients are more likely to be exempted from the scheme. Exception reported patients are more likely to die in the following year, whether they are exempted by the practice for a contraindication or by themselves through informed dissent. Further research is needed to understand the relationship between exception reporting and patient outcomes.