Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?
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SUBMITTER: Clemens J
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4144420 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Apr
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?
Clemens Jeffrey J Gottlieb Joshua D JD
The American economic review 20140401 4
We investigate whether physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply, technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes. In 1997, Medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts physician payments, generating area-specific price shocks. Areas with higher payment shocks experience significant increases in health care supply. On average, a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 3 percent increase in care provision. Elective procedures such as catarac ...[more]
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Project description:PurposeMedical assistants (MAs) have seen their roles expand as a result of team-based primary care models. Unlike their physician counterparts, MAs rarely receive financial incentives as a part of their compensation. This exploratory study aims to understand MA acceptability of financial incentives and perceived MA control over common population health measures.MethodsWe conducted semistructured focus groups between August and December of 2019 across 10 clinics affiliated with 3 institutions in California and Utah. MAs' perceptions of experienced and hypothetical financial incentives, their potential influence on workflow processes, and perceived levels of control over population health measures were discussed, recorded, and qualitatively analyzed for emerging themes. Perceived levels of control were further quantified using a Likert survey; measures were grouped into factors representing vaccinations, and workflow completed in the same day or multiple days (multiday). Mean scores for each factor were compared using repeated 1-way ANOVA with Tukey-Kramer adjustment.ResultsMAs reported little direct experience with financial incentives. They indicated that a hypothetical bonus representing 2% to 3% of their average annual base pay would be acceptable and influential in improving consistent performance during patient rooming workflow. MAs reported having greater perceived control over vaccinations (P <.001) and same-day measures (P <.001) as compared with multiday measures.ConclusionsMAs perceived that relatively small financial incentives would increase their motivation and quality of care. Our findings suggests target measures should focus on MA work processes that are completed in the same day as the patient encounter, particularly vaccinations. Future investigation is needed to understand the effectiveness of MA financial incentives in practice.
| S-EPMC8437570 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectivesNarrative review of the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) and public reporting (PR) on health care outcomes, including spillover effects and impact on disparities.Principal findingsThe impact of P4P and PR is dependent on the underlying payment system (fee-for-service, salary, capitation) into which these schemes are introduced. Both have the potential to improve care, but they can also have substantial unintended consequences. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that individual physicians will vary in how they respond to incentives. We also discuss issues to be considered when including patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) or patient-reported experience measures into P4P and PR schemes.ConclusionWe provide guidance to payers and policy makers on the design of P4P and PR programs so as to maximize their benefits and minimize their unintended consequences. These include involving clinicians in the design of the program, taking into account the payment system into which new incentives are introduced, designing the structure of reward programs to maximize the likelihood of intended outcomes and minimize the likelihood of unintended consequences, designing schemes that minimize the risk of increasing disparities, providing stability of incentives over some years, and including outcomes that are relevant to patients' priorities. In addition, because of the limitations of PR and P4P as effective interventions in their own right, it is important that they are combined with other policies and interventions intended to improve quality to maximize their likely impact.
| S-EPMC5338201 | biostudies-literature
Project description:PURPOSE OF REVIEW:We reviewed recent literature on conditional and unconditional financial incentives for their impact on improving movement through the HIV care cascade and HIV prevention. RECENT FINDINGS:Concepts from behavioral economics may help improve engagement in HIV care by addressing upstream structural risk factors for HIV, such as poverty, or providing conditional rewards for immediate, measurable outcomes related to HIV care. Incentives have been shown to increase uptake of HIV testing. Yet, few studies to date focus on linkage to care: one large USA-based randomized trial failed to show an effect of incentives; and a smaller trial showed improved linkage to care among drug users, but no difference in virologic suppression. Several small USA-based studies have shown an impact of financial incentives on antiretroviral therapy adherence, but without durability beyond the incentive period. HIV prevention has the most robust evidence for decreasing HIV risk-taking behavior among adolescents and may serve as a model for research on the care cascade. SUMMARY:Financial incentives show promise for improving engagement in HIV testing, care, and prevention. Understanding the durability, scalability, ease of implementation, and cost-effectiveness of these different approaches will be critical for maximizing the impact of incentives in curtailing the HIV epidemic.
| S-EPMC4699403 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND AND AIMS:While patient navigation has been shown to be an effective approach for linking persons to HIV care, and contingency management is effective at improving substance use-related outcomes, Project HOPE combined these two interventions in a novel way to engage HIV-positive patients with HIV and substance use treatment. The aims of this paper are to examine patient navigator views regarding how contingency management interacted with and affected their navigation process. DESIGN:Semi-structured qualitative interviews. PARTICIPANTS:22 patient navigators from the original 10 Project HOPE study sites. MEASUREMENTS:Individual, semi-structured interviews lasting approximately 60?min addressed the patient navigator's professional background, descriptions of the participant population, substance use disorder versus HIV treatment entry and engagement issues, and the use of contingency management within the navigation service delivery protocol. FINDINGS:Patient navigators believed that financial incentives helped motivate participant attendance at navigation sessions, particularly early in study involvement, which helped them to establish rapport and develop relationships with participants. Patient navigators often noted that financial incentives positively influenced targeted HIV health-related behaviors, such as attending medical appointments, which provided a rapid pay-off with an escalating sum. Contingency management was more complex when used by the patient navigators for substance use-related behaviors, particularly when incentives revolved around negative urine screening. Patient navigators noted that not all participants responded the same way to the contingency management and that the incentives were particularly helpful when participants were financially strained with limited resources or when internal motivation was lacking. CONCLUSIONS:Overall patient navigators found the inclusion of contingency management to be helpful and affective at influencing participant behaviors, particularly concerning navigation session attendance and HIV healthcare-related participation. However, issues and concerns surrounding the inclusion of contingency management for drug-related behaviors as delivered in Project HOPE were noted. CLINICAL TRIALS REGISTRATION:NCT01612169.
| S-EPMC6404543 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Financial incentives to physicians or patients are increasingly used, but their effectiveness is not well established.To determine whether physician financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician and patient incentives are more effective than control in reducing levels of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) among patients with high cardiovascular risk.Four-group, multicenter, cluster randomized clinical trial with a 12-month intervention conducted from 2011 to 2014 in 3 primary care practices in the northeastern United States. Three hundred forty eligible primary care physicians (PCPs) were enrolled from a pool of 421. Of 25,627 potentially eligible patients of those PCPs, 1503 enrolled. Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if they had a 10-year Framingham Risk Score (FRS) of 20% or greater, had coronary artery disease equivalents with LDL-C levels of 120 mg/dL or greater, or had an FRS of 10% to 20% with LDL-C levels of 140 mg/dL or greater. Investigators were blinded to study group, but participants were not.Primary care physicians were randomly assigned to control, physician incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician-patient incentives. Physicians in the physician incentives group were eligible to receive up to $1024 per enrolled patient meeting LDL-C goals. Patients in the patient incentives group were eligible for the same amount, distributed through daily lotteries tied to medication adherence. Physicians and patients in the shared incentives group shared these incentives. Physicians and patients in the control group received no incentives tied to outcomes, but all patient participants received up to $355 each for trial participation.Change in LDL-C level at 12 months.Patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved a mean reduction in LDL-C of 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 30.1-37.1; baseline, 160.1 mg/dL; 12 months, 126.4 mg/dL); those in physician incentives achieved a mean reduction of 27.9 mg/dL (95% CI, 24.9-31.0; baseline, 159.9 mg/dL; 12 months, 132.0 mg/dL); those in patient incentives achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.6-28.5; baseline, 160.6 mg/dL; 12 months, 135.5 mg/dL); and those in the control group achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.7-28.5; baseline, 161.5 mg/dL; 12 months, 136.4 mg/dL; P <?.001 for comparison of all 4 groups). Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically different from those in the control group (8.5 mg/dL; 95% CI, 3.8-13.3; P =?.002).In primary care practices, shared financial incentives for physicians and patients, but not incentives to physicians or patients alone, resulted in a statistically significant difference in reduction of LDL-C levels at 12 months. This reduction was modest, however, and further information is needed to understand whether this approach represents good value.clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01346189.
| S-EPMC5509443 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceFinancial incentives shared between physicians and patients were shown to significantly reduce low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) levels in a randomized clinical trial, but it is not known whether these health benefits are worth the added incentive and utilization costs required to achieve them.ObjectiveTo evaluate the long-term cost-effectiveness of financial incentives on LDL-C level control.Design, setting, and participantsIn this economic evaluation, a previously validated microsimulation computer model was parameterized using individual-level data from the randomized clinical trial on financial incentives, National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys for model population inputs, and other published sources. The study was conducted from April 15, 2016, to March 29, 2018.InterventionsThe following interventions were used: (1) usual care, (2) trial control strategy (increased cholesterol level monitoring and use of electronic pill bottles), (3) financial incentives for physicians, (4) financial incentives for patients, and (5) incentives shared between physicians and patients.Main outcomes and measuresDiscounted costs (2017 US dollars), lifetime cardiovascular disease risk, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs).ResultsThe model population (n?=?1?000?000 [30.7% women]) had similar mean (SD) age (61.5 [11.9] years) and LDL-C level (153.9 mg/dL) as the observed trial population (n?=?1503 [42.7% women]; age, 62.0 [8.7] years; and LDL-C level, 160.6 mg/dL). Using base-case assumptions (including a 10-year waning period of LDL-C level reductions), the usual-care strategy was dominated (higher costs and lower QALYs) by all other strategies. Strategies for physician- or patient-only incentives were dominated by the shared-incentives strategy, which had an ICER of $60?000/QALY compared with the trial control strategy. In a sensitivity analysis regarding the duration of LDL-C level reductions, the shared-incentives strategy remained cost-effective (ICERs <$100?000/QALY and <$150?000/QALY) for scenarios with LDL-C level reductions lasting, with linear waning, at least 7 and 5 years, respectively. In the 1-way sensitivity analysis for the time horizon of the analysis, the ICER of the shared-incentives strategy exceeded $100?000/QALY at 11 years and $150?000/QALY at 8 years. In probabilistic sensitivity analysis, the shared-incentives intervention was cost-effective in 69% to 77% of iterations using cost-effectiveness thresholds of $100?000 to $150?000/QALY. Cost-effectiveness results were also sensitive to the duration of intervention costs.Conclusions and relevanceThis study suggests that the financial incentives shared between patients and physicians for LDL-C level control meet conventional standards of cost-effectiveness, but these results appeared to be sensitive to assumptions about the durations of LDL-C level reductions and years of intervention costs included, as well as to the choice of time horizon.
| S-EPMC6324619 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Home wireless device monitoring could play an important role in improving the health of patients with poorly controlled chronic diseases, but daily engagement rates among these patients may be low.To test the effectiveness of two different magnitudes of financial incentives for improving adherence to remote-monitoring regimens among patients with poorly controlled diabetes.Randomized, controlled trial. (Clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01282957).Seventy-five patients with a hemoglobin A1c greater than or equal to 7.5% recruited from a Primary Care Medical Home practice at the University of Pennsylvania Health System.Twelve weeks of daily home-monitoring of blood glucose, blood pressure, and weight (control group; n?=?28); a lottery incentive with expected daily value of $2.80 (n?=?26) for daily monitoring; and a lottery incentive with expected daily value of $1.40 (n?=?21) for daily monitoring.Daily use of three home-monitoring devices during the three-month intervention (primary outcome) and during the three-month follow-up period and change in A1c over the intervention period (secondary outcomes).Incentive arm participants used devices on a higher proportion of days relative to control (81% low incentive vs. 58%, P?=?0.007; 77% high incentive vs. 58%, P?=?0.02) during the three-month intervention period. There was no difference in adherence between the two incentive arms (P?=?0.58). When incentives were removed, adherence in the high incentive arm declined while remaining relatively high in the low incentive arm. In month 6, the low incentive arm had an adherence rate of 62% compared to 35% in the high incentive arm (P?=?0.015) and 27% in the control group (P?=?0.002).A daily lottery incentive worth $1.40 per day improved monitoring rates relative to control and had significantly better efficacy once incentives were removed than a higher incentive.
| S-EPMC4000326 | biostudies-literature
Project description:To analyze patient perspectives of the use of financial incentives in a hypertension intervention. Study Setting. Twelve Veterans Affairs primary care clinics over a 9-month period.Qualitative semistructured interviews conducted with 54 hypertensive veterans participating in an intervention to promote guideline-consistent therapy. Intervention components included an intervention letter requesting patients talk with their providers, an offer of U.S.$20 to bring in the letter to their provider, and a health educator phone call.Semistructured interviews were conducted. Transcripts were coded for thematic content. The financial incentive theme was then subcoded for more detailed analysis.Most participants (n=48; 88.9 percent) stated the incentive had (or would have) no effect on their decision to initiate a discussion with their provider. Some participants articulated reservations about the effectiveness and/or appropriateness of financial incentives in health care decisions; however, a few expressed the opinion that there may be some potential benefits to the use of financial incentives if they encourage patients to be active in their health care.The findings of this study raise questions about the appropriateness and unintended consequences of employing patient-directed financial incentives in health care settings.
| S-EPMC3393021 | biostudies-other
Project description:BackgroundPatient experience measures are central to many pay-for-performance (P4P) programs nationally, but the effect of performance-based financial incentives on improving patient care experiences has not been assessed.MethodsThe study uses Clinician & Group CAHPS data from commercially insured adult patients (n = 124,021) who had visits with 1,444 primary care physicians from 25 California medical groups between 2003 and 2006. Medical directors were interviewed to assess the magnitude and nature of financial incentives directed at individual physicians and the patient experience improvement activities adopted by groups. Multilevel regression models were used to assess the relationship between performance change on patient care experience measures and medical group characteristics, financial incentives, and performance improvement activities.ResultsOver the course of the study period, physicians improved performance on the physician-patient communication (0.62 point annual increase, p < 0.001), care coordination (0.48 point annual increase, p < 0.001), and office staff interaction (0.22 point annual increase, p = 0.02) measures. Physicians with lower baseline performance on patient experience measures experienced larger improvements (p < 0.001). Greater emphasis on clinical quality and patient experience criteria in individual physician incentive formulas was associated with larger improvements on the care coordination (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.01) measures. By contrast, greater emphasis on productivity and efficiency criteria was associated with declines in performance on the physician communication (p < 0.01) and office staff interaction (p < 0.001) composites.ConclusionsIn the context of statewide measurement, reporting, and performance-based financial incentives, patient care experiences significantly improved. In order to promote patient-centered care in pay for performance and public reporting programs, the mechanisms by which program features influence performance improvement should be clarified.
| S-EPMC2787940 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceFinancial incentives can improve medication adherence and cardiovascular disease risk, but the optimal design to promote sustained adherence after incentives are discontinued is unknown.ObjectiveTo determine whether 6-month interventions involving different financial incentives to encourage statin adherence reduce low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) levels from baseline to 12 months.Design, setting, and participantsThis 4-group, randomized clinical trial was conducted from August 2013 to July 2018 among several large US insurer or employer populations and the University of Pennsylvania Health System. The study population included adults with elevated risk of cardiovascular disease, suboptimal LDL-C control, and evidence of imperfect adherence to statin medication. Data analysis was performed from July 2017 to June 2019.InterventionsThe interventions lasted 6 months during which all participants received daily medication reminders and an electronic pill bottle. Statin adherence was measured by opening the bottle. For participants randomized to the 3 intervention groups, adherence was rewarded with financial incentives. The sweepstakes group involved incentives for daily adherence. In the deadline sweepstakes group, incentives were reduced if participants were adherent only after a reminder. The sweepstakes plus deposit contract group split incentives between daily adherence and a monthly deposit reduced for each day of nonadherence.Main outcomes and measuresThe primary outcome was change in LDL-C level from baseline to 12 months.ResultsAmong 805 participants randomized (199 in the simple daily sweepstakes group, 204 in the deadline sweepstakes group, 201 in the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group, and 201 in the control group), the mean (SD) age was 58.5 (10.3) years; 519 participants (64.5%) were women, 514 (63.9%) had diabetes, and 273 (33.9%) had cardiovascular disease. The mean (SD) baseline LDL-C level was 143.2 (42.5) mg/dL. Measured adherence at 6 months (defined as the proportion of 180 days with electronic pill bottle opening) in the control group (0.69; 95% CI, 0.66-0.72) was lower than that in the simple sweepstakes group (0.84; 95% CI, 0.81-0.87), the deadline sweepstakes group (0.86; 95% CI, 0.83-0.89), and the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group (0.87; 95% CI, 0.84-0.90) (P < .001 for each incentive group vs control). LDL-C levels were measured for 636 participants at 12 months. Mean LDL-C level reductions from baseline to 12 months were 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 28.4-38.8 mg/dL) in the control group, 32.4 mg/dL (95% CI, 27.3-37.6 mg/dL) in the sweepstakes group, 33.2 mg/dL (95% CI, 28.1-38.3 mg/dL) in the deadline sweepstakes group, and 36.5 mg/dL (95% CI, 31.3-41.7 mg/dL) in the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group (adjusted P > .99 for each incentive group vs control).Conclusions and relevanceCompared with the control group, different financial incentives improved measured statin adherence but not LDL-C levels. This result points to the importance of directly measuring health outcomes, rather than simply adherence, in trials aimed at improving health behaviors.Trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT01798784.
| S-EPMC7547367 | biostudies-literature