Dataset Information

Financial Incentives for Medical Assistants: A Mixed-Methods Exploration of Bonus Structures, Motivation, and Population Health Quality Measures.

ABSTRACT:

Purpose

Medical assistants (MAs) have seen their roles expand as a result of team-based primary care models. Unlike their physician counterparts, MAs rarely receive financial incentives as a part of their compensation. This exploratory study aims to understand MA acceptability of financial incentives and perceived MA control over common population health measures.

Methods

We conducted semistructured focus groups between August and December of 2019 across 10 clinics affiliated with 3 institutions in California and Utah. MAs' perceptions of experienced and hypothetical financial incentives, their potential influence on workflow processes, and perceived levels of control over population health measures were discussed, recorded, and qualitatively analyzed for emerging themes. Perceived levels of control were further quantified using a Likert survey; measures were grouped into factors representing vaccinations, and workflow completed in the same day or multiple days (multiday). Mean scores for each factor were compared using repeated 1-way ANOVA with Tukey-Kramer adjustment.

Results

MAs reported little direct experience with financial incentives. They indicated that a hypothetical bonus representing 2% to 3% of their average annual base pay would be acceptable and influential in improving consistent performance during patient rooming workflow. MAs reported having greater perceived control over vaccinations (P <.001) and same-day measures (P <.001) as compared with multiday measures.

Conclusions

MAs perceived that relatively small financial incentives would increase their motivation and quality of care. Our findings suggests target measures should focus on MA work processes that are completed in the same day as the patient encounter, particularly vaccinations. Future investigation is needed to understand the effectiveness of MA financial incentives in practice.

SUBMITTER: Vilendrer S

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8437570 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Similar Datasets

Project description:BackgroundIn 2013, Zimbabwe's voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) program adopted performance-based financing (PBF) to speed progress towards ambitious VMMC targets. The $25 USD PBF intended to encourage low-paid healthcare workers to remain in the public sector and to strengthen the public healthcare system. The majority of the incentive supports healthcare workers (HCWs) who perform VMMC alongside other routine services; a small portion supports province, district, and facility levels.MethodsThis qualitative study assessed the effect of the PBF on HCW motivation, satisfaction, and professional relationships. The study objectives were to: 1) Gain understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of PBF at the HCW level; 2) Gain understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of PBF at the site level; and 3) Inform scale up, modification, or discontinuation of PBF for the national VMMC program. Sixteen focus groups were conducted: eight with HCWs who received PBF for VMMC and eight with HCWs in the same clinics who did not work in VMMC and, therefore, did not receive PBF. Fourteen key informant interviews ascertained administrator opinion.ResultsFindings suggest that PBF appreciably increased motivation among VMMC teams and helped improve facilities where VMMC services are provided. However, PBF appears to contribute to antagonism at the workplace, creating divisiveness that may reach beyond VMMC. PBF may also cause distortion in the healthcare system: HCWs prioritized incentivized VMMC services over other routine duties. To reduce workplace tension and improve the VMMC program, participants suggested increasing HCW training in VMMC to expand PBF beneficiaries and strengthening integration of VMMC services into routine care.ConclusionIn the low-resource, short-staffed context of Zimbabwe, PBF enabled rapid VMMC scale up and achievement of ambitious targets; however, side effects make PBF less advantageous and sustainable than envisioned. Careful consideration is warranted in choosing whether, and how, to implement PBF to prioritize a public health program.

Project description:BackgroundDespite success in increasing other health behaviors, financial incentives have shown limited to no effect on colorectal cancer (CRC screening. Little is known about the factors shaping why and for whom incentives improve screening.ObjectiveTo explore the perspective of participants enrolled in a larger, four-arm pragmatic trial at urban family medicine practices which assessed and failed to detect significant effects of financial incentives on at-home CRC screening completion.DesignWe performed a mixed methods study with a subset of randomly selected patients, stratified by study arm, following completion of the pragmatic trial.ParticipantsSixty patients (46.9% enrollment rate) who were eligible and overdue for colorectal cancer screening at the time of trial enrollment and who continued to receive care at family medicine practices affiliated with an urban academic health system completed the interview and questionnaire.Main measuresUsing Andersen's behavioral model, a semi-structured interview guide assessed motivators, barriers, and facilitators to screening completion and the impact of incentives on decision-making. Participants also completed a brief questionnaire evaluating demographics, screening beliefs, and clinical characteristics.Key resultsThe majority of patients (n = 49; 82%) reported that incentives would not change their decision to complete or not complete CRC screening, which was confirmed by qualitative data as largely due to high perceived health benefits. Those who stated financial incentives would impact their decision (n = 11) were significantly less likely to agree that CRC screening is beneficial (72.7% vs 95.9%; p < 0.05) or that CRC could be cured if detected early (63.6% vs 98.0%; p < 0.05).ConclusionsFinancial incentives are likely not an effective behavioral intervention to increase CRC screening for all but may be powerful for increasing short-term benefit and therefore completion for some. Targeting financial incentive interventions according to patient screening beliefs may prove a cost-effective strategy in primary care outreach programs to increase CRC screening.

Project description:Health insurers worldwide implement financial incentive schemes to encourage health-related behaviours, including to facilitate weight loss. The maintenance of weight loss is a public health challenge, and as non-communicable diseases become more prevalent with increasing age, mid-older adults could benefit from programs which motivate weight loss maintenance. However, little is understood about their perceptions of using financial incentives to maintain weight loss.We used mixed methods to explore the attitudes and views of participants who had completed an Australian weight loss and lifestyle modification program offered to overweight and obese health insurance members with weight-related chronic diseases, about the acceptability and usefulness of different types of financial incentives to support weight loss maintenance. An online survey was completed by 130 respondents (mean age?=?64 years); and a further 28 participants (mean age?=?65 years) attended six focus groups.Both independent samples of participants supported a formalised maintenance program. Online survey respondents reported that non-cash (85.2%) and cash (77%) incentives would be potentially motivating; but only 40.5% reported that deposit contracts would motivate weight loss maintenance. Results of in-depth discussions found overall low support for any type of financial incentive, but particularly deposit contracts and lotteries. Some participants expressed that improved health was of more value than a monetary incentive and that they felt personally responsible for their own health, which was at odds with the idea of financial incentives. Others suggested ongoing program and peer support as potentially useful for weight loss maintenance.If financial incentives are considered for mid-older Australian adults in the health insurance setting, program planners will need to balance the discordance between participant beliefs about the individual responsibility for health and their desire for external supports to motivate and sustain weight loss maintenance.

Project description:BackgroundFinancial incentives are often used to improve quality of care in chronic care patients. However, the evidence concerning the effect of financial incentives is still inconclusive.ObjectiveTo test the effect of financial incentives on quality measures (QMs) in the treatment of patients with diabetes mellitus in primary care. We incentivized a clinical QM and a process QM to test the effect of financial incentives on different types of QMs and to investigate the spill-over effect on non-incentivized QMs.Design/participantsParallel cluster randomized controlled trial based on electronic medical records database involving Swiss general practitioners (GPs). Practices were randomly allocated.InterventionAll participants received a bimonthly feedback report. The intervention group additionally received potential financial incentives on GP level depending on their performance.Main measuresBetween-group differences in proportions of patients fulfilling incentivized QM (process QM of annual HbA1c measurement and clinical QM of blood pressure level below 140/95 mmHg) after 12 months.Key resultsSeventy-one GPs (median age 52 years, 72% male) from 43 different practices and subsequently 3838 patients with diabetes mellitus (median age 70 years, 57% male) were included. Proportions of patients with annual HbA1c measurements remained unchanged (intervention group decreased from 79.0 to 78.3%, control group from 81.5 to 81.0%, OR 1.09, 95% CI 0.90-1.32, p = 0.39). Proportions of patients with blood pressure below 140/95 improved from 49.9 to 52.5% in the intervention group and decreased from 51.2 to 49.0% in the control group (OR 1.16, 95% CI 0.99-1.36, p = 0.06). Proportions of non-incentivized process QMs increased significantly in the intervention group.ConclusionGP level financial incentives did not result in more frequent HbA1c measurements or in improved blood pressure control. Interestingly, we could confirm a spill-over effect on non-incentivized process QMs. Yet, the mechanism of spill-over effects of financial incentives is largely unclear.Trial registrationISRCTN13305645.