Dataset Information

Potential benefits of minimum unit pricing for alcohol versus a ban on below cost selling in England 2014: modelling study.

ABSTRACT:

Objective

To evaluate the potential impact of two alcohol control policies under consideration in England: banning below cost selling of alcohol and minimum unit pricing.

Design

Modelling study using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version 2.5.

Setting

England 2014-15.

Population

Adults and young people aged 16 or more, including subgroups of moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinkers.

Interventions

Policy to ban below cost selling, which means that the selling price to consumers could not be lower than tax payable on the product, compared with policies of minimum unit pricing at £0.40 (€0.57; $0.75), 45 p, and 50 p per unit (7.9 g/10 mL) of pure alcohol.

Main outcome measures

Changes in mean consumption in terms of units of alcohol, drinkers' expenditure, and reductions in deaths, illnesses, admissions to hospital, and quality adjusted life years.

Results

The proportion of the market affected is a key driver of impact, with just 0.7% of all units estimated to be sold below the duty plus value added tax threshold implied by a ban on below cost selling, compared with 23.2% of units for a 45 p minimum unit price. Below cost selling is estimated to reduce harmful drinkers' mean annual consumption by just 0.08%, around 3 units per year, compared with 3.7% or 137 units per year for a 45 p minimum unit price (an approximately 45 times greater effect). The ban on below cost selling has a small effect on population health-saving an estimated 14 deaths and 500 admissions to hospital per annum. In contrast, a 45 p minimum unit price is estimated to save 624 deaths and 23,700 hospital admissions. Most of the harm reductions (for example, 89% of estimated deaths saved per annum) are estimated to occur in the 5.3% of people who are harmful drinkers.

Conclusions

The ban on below cost selling, implemented in the England in May 2014, is estimated to have small effects on consumption and health harm. The previously announced policy of a minimum unit price, if set at expected levels between 40 p and 50 p per unit, is estimated to have an approximately 40-50 times greater effect.

SUBMITTER: Brennan A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4180296 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:BackgroundSeveral countries are considering a minimum price policy for alcohol, but concerns exist about the potential effects on drinkers with low incomes. We aimed to assess the effect of a £0·45 minimum unit price (1 unit is 8 g/10 mL ethanol) in England across the income and socioeconomic distributions.MethodsWe used the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) version 2.6, a causal, deterministic, epidemiological model, to assess effects of a minimum unit price policy. SAPM accounts for alcohol purchasing and consumption preferences for population subgroups including income and socioeconomic groups. Purchasing preferences are regarded as the types and volumes of alcohol beverages, prices paid, and the balance between on-trade (eg, bars) and off-trade (eg, shops). We estimated price elasticities from 9 years of survey data and did sensitivity analyses with alternative elasticities. We assessed effects of the policy on moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinkers, split into three socioeconomic groups (living in routine or manual households, intermediate households, and managerial or professional households). We examined policy effects on alcohol consumption, spending, rates of alcohol-related health harm, and opportunity costs associated with that harm. Rates of harm and costs were estimated for a 10 year period after policy implementation. We adjusted baseline rates of mortality and morbidity to account for differential risk between socioeconomic groups.FindingsOverall, a minimum unit price of £0.45 led to an immediate reduction in consumption of 1.6% (-11.7 units per drinker per year) in our model. Moderate drinkers were least affected in terms of consumption (-3.8 units per drinker per year for the lowest income quintile vs 0.8 units increase for the highest income quintile) and spending (increase in spending of £0.04 vs £1.86 per year). The greatest behavioural changes occurred in harmful drinkers (change in consumption of -3.7% or -138.2 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of £4.01), especially in the lowest income quintile (-7.6% or -299.8 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of £34.63) compared with the highest income quintile (-1.0% or -34.3 units, with an increase in spending of £16.35). Estimated health benefits from the policy were also unequally distributed. Individuals in the lowest socioeconomic group (living in routine or manual worker households and comprising 41.7% of the sample population) would accrue 81.8% of reductions in premature deaths and 87.1% of gains in terms of quality-adjusted life-years.InterpretationIrrespective of income, moderate drinkers were little affected by a minimum unit price of £0.45 in our model, with the greatest effects noted for harmful drinkers. Because harmful drinkers on low incomes purchase more alcohol at less than the minimum unit price threshold compared with other groups, they would be affected most by this policy. Large reductions in consumption in this group would however coincide with substantial health gains in terms of morbidity and mortality related to reduced alcohol consumption.FundingUK Medical Research Council and Economic and Social Research Council (grant G1000043).

Project description:Background and aimsMinimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland on 1 May 2018, and is now on the policy agenda in other devolved administrations and at Westminster. Previous research has explored the arguments deployed for and against MUP, but the congruence between actors in the MUP debate has not been sufficiently examined. This study identified and mapped the discourse coalitions that emerged in the UK MUP debate through an analysis of actors' use of arguments in media coverage of the policy debates.DesignA sample of print media coverage of MUP was obtained from the LexisNexis newspaper database. The resulting sample was imported into discourse network analysis (DNA) software for coding and subsequent visualization of actor networks.SettingUnited Kingdom.ObservationsA total of 348 articles from eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers from an 18-month period, ending in November 2012, were analysed.MeasurementsActors' arguments were coded to generate structured data for conversion into a weighted actor network where ties represent similarities among actors in terms of arguments in support of or opposition to MUP.FindingsTwo polarized discourse coalitions, Opponents and Proponents of MUP, emerged in media coverage. The Proponents coalition consisted mainly of health advocacy groups, charities, political parties and academic institutions. In the Opponents coalition, the networks were formed of key alcohol manufacturers and economic think-tanks. While producer organizations were central to the Opponents coalition, some commercial actors were more favourable to MUP, highlighting divisions within the industry overall.ConclusionsMedia coverage of minimum unit pricing (MUP) in Scotland from June 2011 to November 2012 showed alignment between the policy positions of (1) alcohol producers and think-tanks opposed to MUP; and (2) public health advocates and health charities in favour of the policy. Some alcohol industry actors were supportive of MUP indicating divisions among the industry. Discourse network analysis may be usefully applied to study other highly contested policy issues in health and beyond.