The sense of agency during continuous action: performance is more important than action-feedback association.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Wen W
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4404253 | biostudies-literature | 2015
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Here, we investigated whether explicit feedback on the result of the action (success or failure) modified sense of agency (SoA) in a continuous action task. Participants carried a white dot with a delay to a target square while avoiding obstacle squares. The color of the target changed unpredictably between white and blue. A trial was considered as successful or failed if the dot reached the target while it was white or blue. Thus, actions during the task resulted in almost identical experiences of successful and failed trials. After each trial, the participants reported to what extent they felt that they had been in control of the dot. The results showed that SoA was higher with shorter delay (i.e., easier control) and in the successful trials. These findings indicate that the sense of online control and the evaluation of continuous action based on feedback independently influence SoA. Particularly, the evaluation retrospectively modulated SoA.
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Project description:The sense of agency is defined as the subjective experience that "I" am the one who is causing the action. Theoretical studies postulate that this subjective experience is developed through multistep processes extending from the sensorimotor to the cognitive level. However, it remains unclear how the brain processes such different levels of information and constitutes the neural substrates for the sense of agency. To answer this question, we combined two strategies: an experimental paradigm, in which self-agency gradually evolves according to sensorimotor experience, and a multivoxel pattern analysis. The combined strategies revealed that the sensorimotor, posterior parietal, anterior insula, and higher visual cortices contained information on self-other attribution during movement. In addition, we investigated whether the found regions showed a preference for self-other attribution or for sensorimotor information. As a result, the right supramarginal gyrus, a portion of the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), was found to be the most sensitive to self-other attribution among the found regions, while the bilateral precentral gyri and left IPL dominantly reflected sensorimotor information. Our results demonstrate that multiple brain regions are involved in the development of the sense of agency and that these show specific preferences for different levels of information.
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Project description:Non-motor aspects in dystonia are now well recognized. The sense of agency, which refers to the experience of controlling one's own actions, has been scarcely studied in dystonia, even though its disturbances can contribute to movement disorders. Among various brain structures, the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum, and the basal ganglia are involved in shaping the sense of agency. In myoclonus dystonia, resulting from a dysfunction of the motor network, an altered sense of agency may contribute to the clinical phenotype of the condition. In this study, we compared the explicit and implicit sense of agency in patients with myoclonus dystonia caused by a pathogenic variant of SGCE (DYT-SGCE) and control participants. We utilized behavioural tasks to assess the sense of agency and performed neuroimaging analyses, including structural, resting-state functional connectivity, and dynamic causal modelling, to explore the relevant brain regions involved in the sense of agency. Additionally, we examined the relationship between behavioural performance, symptom severity, and neuroimaging findings. We compared 19 patients with DYT-SGCE and 24 healthy volunteers. Our findings revealed that patients with myoclonus-dystonia exhibited a specific impairment in explicit sense of agency, particularly when implicit motor learning was involved. However, their implicit sense of agency remained intact. These patients also displayed grey-matter abnormalities in the motor cerebellum, as well as increased functional connectivity between the cerebellum and pre-supplementary motor area. Dynamic causal modelling analysis further identified reduced inhibitory effects of the cerebellum on the pre-supplementary motor area, decreased excitatory effects of the pre-supplementary motor area on the cerebellum, and increased self-inhibition within the pre-supplementary motor area. Importantly, both cerebellar grey-matter alterations and functional connectivity abnormalities between the cerebellum and pre-supplementary motor area were found to correlate with explicit sense of agency impairment. Increased self-inhibition within the pre-supplementary motor area was associated with less severe myoclonus symptoms. These findings highlight the disruption of higher-level cognitive processes in patients with myoclonus-dystonia, further expanding the spectrum of neurological and psychiatric dysfunction already identified in this disorder.
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Project description:Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N1 amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent. We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real-time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone.
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