Money Affects Theory of Mind Differently by Gender.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Ridinger G
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4669079 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:BackgroundThere appears to be an overlap between the limbic system, which is modulated by subthalamic nucleus (STN) deep brain stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson's disease (PD), and the brain network that mediates theory of mind (ToM). Accordingly, the aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of STN DBS on ToM of PD patients and to correlate ToM modifications with changes in glucose metabolism.Methodology/principal findingsTo this end, we conducted (18)FDG-PET scans in 13 PD patients in pre- and post-STN DBS conditions and correlated changes in their glucose metabolism with modified performances on the Eyes test, a visual ToM task requiring them to describe thoughts or feelings conveyed by photographs of the eye region. Postoperative PD performances on this emotion recognition task were significantly worse than either preoperative PD performances or those of healthy controls (HC), whereas there was no significant difference between preoperative PD and HC. Conversely, PD patients in the postoperative condition performed within the normal range on the gender attribution task included in the Eyes test. As far as the metabolic results are concerned, there were correlations between decreased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in several cortical areas: the bilateral cingulate gyrus (BA 31), right middle frontal gyrus (BA 8, 9 and 10), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), temporal lobe (fusiform gyrus, BA 20), bilateral parietal lobe (right BA 3 and right and left BA 7) and bilateral occipital lobe (BA 19). There were also correlations between increased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in the left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 13 and BA 47) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). All these structures overlap with the brain network that mediates ToM.Conclusion/significanceThese results seem to confirm that STN DBS hinders the ability to infer the mental states of others and modulates a distributed network known to subtend ToM.
| S-EPMC2847915 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Moving together in time affects human social affiliation and cognition. However, it is unclear whether these effects hold for on-line video meetings and whether they extend to empathy (understanding or sharing others' emotions) and theory of mind (ToM; attribution of mental states to others). 126 young adult participants met through online video in unacquainted pairs. Participants either performed 3 min of synchronous arm movements paced by sounds (n = 40), asynchronous movements (n = 46) or a small talk condition (n = 40). In a subsequent empathy task, participants engaged in a conversation. A video recording of this conversation was played back, and each participant rated, at predetermined time points, how they felt and how they thought their partner felt. From this we calculated empathic accuracy (accuracy of the estimation of the other's emotions) and emotional congruence (emotion sharing). ToM was measured by showing videos of geometrical shapes interacting and asking the participants to describe what happened, measuring the amount of intentionality. We found that participants in the synchrony condition rated feeling greater closeness and similarity to their partners relative to the asynchronous condition. Further, participants in the synchrony group tended to ascribe more intentionality to the abstract shapes than participants in asynchrony condition, suggesting greater ToM. Synchrony and asynchrony groups did not reliably differ in empathic accuracy nor emotional congruence. These results suggest that moving in synchrony has effects on social affiliation measures even in online encounters. These effects extend to ToM tendencies but not empathic accuracy or emotion sharing. These results highlight the potential of synchronous movement in online encounters to affect a subset of social cognition and affiliation measures.
| S-EPMC9450704 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This paper introduces a model of 'theory of mind', namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a 'game theory of mind'. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a 'stag-hunt'. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution.
| S-EPMC2596313 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Human strategic interaction requires reasoning about other people's behavior and mental states, combined with an understanding of their incentives. However, the ontogenic development of strategic reasoning is not well understood: At what age do we show a capacity for sophisticated play in social interactions? Several lines of inquiry suggest an important role for recursive thinking (RT) and theory of mind (ToM), but these capacities leave out the strategic element. We posit a strategic theory of mind (SToM) integrating ToM and RT with reasoning about incentives of all players. We investigated SToM in 3- to 9-y-old children and adults in two games that represent prevalent aspects of social interaction. Children anticipate deceptive and competitive moves from the other player and play both games in a strategically sophisticated manner by 7 y of age. One game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium: In this game, children achieve equilibrium play by the age of 7 y on the first move. In the other game, with a single mixed-strategy equilibrium, children's behavior moved toward the equilibrium with experience. These two results also correspond to two ways in which children's behavior resembles adult behavior in the same games. In both games, children's behavior becomes more strategically sophisticated with age on the first move. Beyond the age of 7 y, children begin to think about strategic interaction not myopically, but in a farsighted way, possibly with a view to cooperating and capitalizing on mutual gains in long-run relationships.
| S-EPMC4169981 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Background: Several meta-analyses highlight pronounced problems in general Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other persons' mental states, in patients with psychosis in comparison to non-clinical controls. In addition, first studies suggest associations between Hyper-ToM, an exaggerated inference of mental states to others, and delusions. Research on different ToM subtypes (Cognitive ToM, Affective ToM, and Hyper-ToM) and symptom clusters of psychosis (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) have gathered conflicting findings. Thus, the present study examined group differences between patients with psychosis and non-clinical controls concerning Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM and Hyper-ToM. Further, the association between ToM subtypes and symptom clusters (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) were examined. Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 64, 1/3 with present delusions indicated by a minimum score of four in the PANSS P1 item) and non-clinical controls (n = 21) were examined with assessments of Cognitive ToM and Affective ToM abilities and Hyper-ToM errors using the Frith-Happé animations. Psychopathology was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Results: Patients with psychosis presented more pronounced problems in Cognitive and Affective ToM in comparison to non-clinical controls, whereas there were no group differences with regard to Hyper-ToM errors. Furthermore, deficits in Cognitive ToM were associated with general delusions, whereas problems in Affective ToM were associated with negative and disorganized symptoms. In addition, there was no association between Hyper-ToM errors and any symptoms when controlling for years of education. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that deficits in ToM subtypes might not be directly related to delusions and positive symptoms and are in line with more recently developed cognitive models of delusions. In addition, our results support the well-established finding of associations between ToM alterations and negative or disorganized symptoms. Our results shed light on the role of different dimensions of ToM in specific symptoms of psychosis.
| S-EPMC8062806 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Despite broad interest, experimental evidence for gender differences in social abilities remains inconclusive. Two important factors may have limited previous results: (i) a lack of clear distinctions between empathy (sharing another's feelings), compassion (a feeling of concern toward others), and Theory of Mind (ToM; inferring others' mental states), and (ii) the absence of robust, naturalistic social tasks. Overcoming these limitations, in Study 1 (N = 295) we integrate three independent, previously published datasets, each using a dynamic and situated, video-based paradigm which disentangles ToM, empathy, and compassion, to examine gender differences in social abilities. We observed greater empathy and compassion in women compared to men, but found no evidence that either gender performed better in ToM. In Study 2 (n = 226) we extend this paradigm to allow participants to engage in prosocial donations. Along with replicating the findings of Study 1, we also observed greater prosocial donations in women compared to men. Additionally, we discuss an exploratory, novel finding, namely that ToM performance is positively associated with prosocial donations in women, but not men. Overall, these results emphasize the importance of establishing experimental designs that incorporate dynamic, complex stimuli to better capture the social realities that men and women experience in their daily lives.
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Project description: Not available
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Project description:Human success and even survival depends on our ability to predict what others will do by guessing what they are thinking. If I accelerate, will he yield? If I propose, will she accept? If I confess, will they forgive? Psychologists call this capacity "theory of mind." According to current theories, we solve this problem by assuming that others are rational actors. That is, we assume that others design and execute efficient plans to achieve their goals, given their knowledge. But if this view is correct, then our theory of mind is startlingly incomplete. Human action is not always a product of rational planning, and we would be mistaken to always interpret others' behaviors as such. A wealth of evidence indicates that we often act habitually-a form of behavioral control that depends not on rational planning, but rather on a history of reinforcement. We aim to test whether the human theory of mind includes a theory of habitual action and to assess when and how it is deployed. In a series of studies, we show that human theory of mind is sensitive to factors influencing the balance between habitual and planned behavior.
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Project description:Even though the Theory of Mind in upper primates has been under investigation for decades, how it may evolve remains an open problem. We propose here an evolutionary game theoretical model where a finite population of individuals may use reasoning strategies to infer a response to the anticipated behavior of others within the context of a sequential dilemma, i.e., the Centipede Game. We show that strategies with bounded reasoning evolve and flourish under natural selection, provided they are allowed to make reasoning mistakes and a temptation for higher future gains is in place. We further show that non-deterministic reasoning co-evolves with an optimism bias that may lead to the selection of new equilibria, closely associated with average behavior observed in experimental data. This work reveals both a novel perspective on the evolution of bounded rationality and a co-evolutionary link between the evolution of Theory of Mind and the emergence of misbeliefs.
| S-EPMC10830857 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Previous research has shown that the development of theory of mind (ToM) depends on various individual and social factors, but very little research has examined the role of the natural educational environment in the development of ToM in middle childhood. In accordance with the importance of social factors in development, in this longitudinal study of 156 typically developing children, we investigated whether educational setting-classes containing children with disabilities (inclusive) or without such children (general education)-is associated with enhanced ToM development. ToM was measured with the ToM Scale, the Chocolate task and the Faux Pas Recognition Test. Analysis showed that ToM development was better among children educated in inclusive classes than among those educated in traditional classes. The results have implications for ToM development among children with and without disabilities as well as for educational practice.
| S-EPMC7428351 | biostudies-literature