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Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.

ABSTRACT: Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism that can maintain such coherence of reputations in the face of errors of transmission. Random errors, however, are not the only source of uncertainty in such situations. The possibility of deceptive communication, where the signallers aim to misinform the receiver cannot be excluded. While there is plenty of evidence for deceptive communication in humans the possibility of deception is not yet incorporated into models of indirect reciprocity. Here we show that when deceptive strategies are allowed in the population it will cause the collapse of the coherence of reputations and thus in turn it results the collapse of cooperation. This collapse is independent of the norms and the cost and benefit values. It is due to the fact that there is no selection for honest communication in the framework of indirect reciprocity. It follows that indirect reciprocity can be only proposed plausibly as a mechanism of human cooperation if additional mechanisms are specified in the model that maintains honesty.

SUBMITTER: Szamado S

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4732813 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:Biological macromolecules encode information: some of it to endow the molecule with structural flexibility, some of it to enable molecular actions as a catalyst or a substrate, but a residual part can be used to communicate with other macromolecules. Thus, macromolecules do not need to possess information only to survive in an environment, but also to strategically interact with others by sending signals to a receiving macromolecule that can properly interpret the signal and act suitably. These sender-receiver signalling games are sustained by the information asymmetry that exists among the macromolecules. In both biochemistry and molecular evolution, the important role of information asymmetry remains largely unaddressed. Here, we provide a new unifying perspective on the impact of information symmetry between macromolecules on molecular evolutionary processes, while focusing on molecular deception. Biomolecular games arise from the ability of biological macromolecules to exert precise recognition, and their role as units of selection, meaning that they are subject to competition and cooperation with other macromolecules. Thus, signalling game theory can be used to better understand fundamental features of living systems such as molecular recognition, molecular mimicry, selfish elements and 'junk' DNA. We show how deceptive behaviour at the molecular level indicates a conflict of interest, and so provides evidence of genetic conflict. This model proposes that molecular deception is diagnostic of selfish behaviour, helping to explain the evasive behaviour of transposable elements in 'junk' DNA, for example. Additionally, in this broad review, a range of major evolutionary transitions are shown to be associated with the establishment of signalling conventions, many of which are susceptible to molecular deception. These perspectives allow us to assign rudimentary behaviour to macromolecules, and show how participation in signalling games differentiates biochemistry from abiotic chemistry.

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Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.

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