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Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models.

ABSTRACT: Reciprocity toward a partner's cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one's partner's previous action but also one's own previous action-such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning-has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used to explain the variances in cooperative behavior among people. To do this, we considered games involving either direct reciprocity (an iterated prisoner's dilemma) or generalized reciprocity (a gift-giving game). Multilevel models incorporating inter-individual behavioral differences were fitted to experimental data using Bayesian inference. The results indicate that for these two types of games, a model that considers both one's own and one's partner's previous actions fits the empirical data better than the other models. In the direct reciprocity game, mutual cooperation or defection-rather than relying solely on one's partner's previous actions-affected the increase or decrease, respectively, in subsequent cooperation. Whereas in the generalized reciprocity game, a weaker effect of mutual cooperation or defection on subsequent cooperation was observed.

SUBMITTER: Horita Y

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7676727 | biostudies-literature | 2020

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models.

Horita Yutaka Y

PloS one 20201119 11

Reciprocity toward a partner's cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one's partner's previous action but also one's own previous action-such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning-has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used t ...[more]

PMID: 33211745

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Project description:This paper investigates cooperation games in which poor agents do not benefit from cooperation with wealthy agents. They instead benefit from considering wealth relative to decision payoffs of fitness or wealth. Of concern is the effect of cooperation on participants, their rational self-interest and choices, and not the evolution of cooperation directly. The accumulation of fitness or wealth has been shown in the literature to lead to different optimal strategies for wealthy and poor players in Chicken games. The effect could have important explanatory power if it were more broadly applicable. First we empirically compare two published results, one involving the temptation parameter vs. degree of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma, and the other a surprising result from a public goods game with participants from different cultures, networks and wealth in which a fixed rather than relative payoff scheme was used. Using the temptation data to calibrate the public goods behavior suggests wealth factors can provide an explanation for the results. Second we show using simulation that adding a survival threshold to a wealth or fitness accumulating Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma produces a wealth relative effect. We clarify previous results to show the poor must avoid survival risk, regardless of whether this is associated with cooperation or defection. We do this by introducing the Farmer's Game, a simulation of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with wealth accumulation and a survival threshold. This is used to evaluate the Tit-for-Tat strategy and four variants. Equilibrium payoffs keep the game scaled to social relevance, with a fraction of all payoffs externalized as a turn cost parameter. Findings include poor performance of Tit-for-Tat near the survival threshold, superior performance of low risk strategies for both poor and wealthy players, dependence of survival of the poor near the threshold on Tit-for-Tat forgiveness, unexpected optimization of forgiveness without encountering a social dilemma, improved performance of a diverse mix of strategies, and a more abrupt threshold of social catastrophe for the better performing mix. Lastly we compare cooperating and non-cooperating societies using the simulation and discover disturbing connections between cooperation and familiar non-egalitarian wealth distribution patterns.

Dataset Information

Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models.

Publications

Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models.

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