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RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.

ABSTRACT: Health Insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act implement reinsurance and risk corridors. Reinsurance limits insurer costs associated with specific individuals, while risk corridors protect against aggregate losses. Both tighten the insurer's distribution of expected costs. This paper compares the economic costs and consequences of reinsurance and risk corridors. We simulate the insurer's cost distribution under reinsurance and risk corridors using data for a group of individuals likely to enroll in Marketplace plans from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We compare reinsurance and risk corridors in terms of risk reduction and incentives for cost containment. We find that reinsurance and one-sided risk corridors achieve comparable levels of risk reduction for a given level of incentives. We also find that the policies being implemented in the Marketplaces (a mix of reinsurance and two-sided risk corridor policies) substantially limit insurer risk but perform similarly to a simpler stand-alone reinsurance policy.

SUBMITTER: Layton TJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4785828 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.

Layton Timothy J TJ McGuire Thomas G TG Sinaiko Anna D AD

American journal of health economics 20160101 1

Health Insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act implement reinsurance and risk corridors. Reinsurance limits insurer costs associated with specific individuals, while risk corridors protect against aggregate losses. Both tighten the insurer's distribution of expected costs. This paper compares the economic costs and consequences of reinsurance and risk corridors. We simulate the insurer's cost distribution under reinsurance and risk corridors using data for a group of indivi ...[more]

PMID: 26973861

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Project description:Background Second medical opinions can give patients confidence when choosing among treatment options and help them understand their diagnosis. Health insurers in several countries, including Germany, offer formal second opinion programs (SecOPs). We systematically collected and analyzed information on German health insurers’ approach to SecOPs, how the SecOPs are structured, and to what extent they are evaluated. Methods In April 2019, we sent a questionnaire by post to all German statutory (n =?109) and private health insurers (n =?52). In September 2019, we contacted the nonresponders by email. The results were analyzed descriptively. They are presented overall and grouped by type of insurance (statutory/private health insurer). Results Thirty one of One hundred sixty one health insurers (response rate 19%) agreed to participate. The participating insurers covered approximately 40% of the statutory and 34% of the private health insured people. A total of 44 SecOPs were identified with a median of 1 SecOP (interquartile range (IQR) 1–2) offered by a health insurer. SecOPs were in place mainly for orthopedic (21/28 insurers with SecOPs; 75%) and oncologic indications (20/28; 71%). Indications were chosen principally based on their potential impact on a patient (22/28; 79%). The key qualification criterion for second opinion providers was their expertise (30/44 SecOPs; 68%). Second opinions were usually provided based on submitted documents only (21/44; 48%) or on direct contact between a patient and a doctor (20/44; 45%). They were delivered after a median of 9?days (IQR 5–15). A median of 31 (IQR 7–85) insured persons per year used SecOPs. Only 12 of 44 SecOPs were confirmed to have conducted a formal evaluation process (27%) or, if not, plan such a process in the future (10/22; 45%). Conclusion Health insurers’ SecOPs focus on orthopedic and oncologic indications and are based on submitted documents or on direct patient-physician contact. The formal evaluation of SecOPs needs to be expanded and the results should be published. This can allow the evaluation of the impact of SecOPs on insured persons’ health status and satisfaction, as well as on the number of interventions performed. Our results should be interpreted with caution due to the low participation rate. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-021-06207-8.

Project description:ImportanceThe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) individual marketplaces are a source of insurance for millions of residents in the US. However, the association between enrollee risk, health spending, and metal tier selection remains unclear.ObjectivesTo describe individual marketplace enrollees' metal tier selections by risk score and assess enrollees' health spending by metal tier, risk score, and spending type.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective, cross-sectional study analyzed claims data from the Wakely Consulting Group ACA database, a deidentified claims database built on data voluntarily submitted by insurers. Enrollees with continuous, full-year enrollment in on-exchange or off-exchange ACA-qualified health plans during the 2019 contract year were included. Data analysis was conducted from March 2021 to January 2023.Main outcomes and measuresEnrollment totals, total spending, and out-of-pocket cost were calculated, stratified by metal tier and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score for 2019.ResultsEnrollment and claims data were obtained for 1 317 707 enrollees (53.5% female; mean [SD] age, 46.35 [13.43] years) across all census areas, age groups, and sexes. Of these, 34.6% were on plans with cost-sharing reductions (CSRs), 75.5% did not have an assigned HCC, and 84.0% submitted at least 1 claim. Compared with enrollees in bronze plans (17.2%), enrollees were more likely to be classified in the top HHS-HCC risk quartile if they selected platinum (42.0%), gold (34.4%), or silver (29.7%) plans. The highest share of enrollees with $0 total spending was noted with the catastrophic (26.4%) and bronze (22.7%) plans, while gold plans had the lowest share (8.1%). Median total spending was lower among bronze plan enrollees ($593; IQR, $28-$2100) vs platinum ($4111; IQR, $992-$15 821) or gold ($2675; IQR, $728-$9070). Within the top risk score decile, CSR enrollees had less average total spending than any other metal tier by more than 10%.Conclusions and relevanceIn this cross-sectional study of the ACA individual marketplace, enrollees who selected plans with higher actuarial value also had greater mean HHS-HCC risk scores and health spending. The findings suggest these differences may be associated with variation in benefit generosity by metal tier, enrollee's perceptions of future health needs, or other barriers to care access.

Project description:ObjectiveIn 2014, an estimated 15 million individuals who currently do not have health insurance, including many with chronic mental illness, are expected to obtain coverage through state insurance exchanges. The authors examined how two mechanisms in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), namely, risk adjustment and reinsurance, might perform to ensure the financial solvency of health plans that have a disproportionate share of enrollees with mental health conditions. Risk adjustment is an ACA provision requiring that a federal or state exchange move funds from insurance plans with healthier enrollees to plans with sicker enrollees. Reinsurance is a provision in which all plans in the state contribute to an overall pool of money that is used to reimburse costs to individual market plans for expenditures of any individual enrollee that exceed a high predetermined level.MethodUsing 2006--2007 claims data from a sample of private and public health plans, the authors compared expected health plan compensation under diagnosis-based risk adjustment with actual health care expenditures, under different assumptions for chronic mental health and medical conditions. Analyses were conducted with and without the addition of $100,000 reinsurance.ResultsRisk adjustment performed well for most plans. For some plans with a high share of enrollees with mental health conditions, underpayment was substantial enough to raise concern. Reinsurance appeared to be helpful in addressing the most serious underpayment problems remaining after risk adjustment. Risk adjustment performed similarly for health plan cohorts that had a disproportionate share of enrollees with chronic mental health and medical conditions.ConclusionsCost models indicate that the regulatory provisions in the ACA requiring risk adjustment and reinsurance can help protect health plans covering treatment for mentally ill individuals against risk selection. This model analysis may be useful for advocates for individuals with mental illness in considering their own state's insurance exchange.

Dataset Information

RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.

Publications

RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.

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