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Socially Enforced Nepotism: How Norms and Reputation Can Amplify Kin Altruism.

ABSTRACT: Kin selection, which can lead organisms to behave altruistically to their genetic relatives, works differently when-as is often the case in human societies-altruism can be boosted by social pressure. Here I present a model of social norms enforced by indirect reciprocity. In the model there are many alternative stable allocations of rewards ("distributional norms"); a stable norm is stable in the sense that each player is best off following the norm if other players do the same. Stable norms vary widely in how equally they reward players with unequal abilities. In a population of mixed groups (some group members follow one norm, some follow another, and some compromise) with modest within-group coefficients of relatedness, selection within groups favors those who compromise, and selection between groups favors generous generalized reciprocity rather than balanced reciprocity. Thus evolved social norms can amplify kin altruism, giving rise to a uniquely human mode of kin-based sociality distinct from spontaneous altruism among close kin, or cooperation among non-kin.

SUBMITTER: Jones D

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4909296 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Socially Enforced Nepotism: How Norms and Reputation Can Amplify Kin Altruism.

Jones Doug D

PloS one 20160615 6

Kin selection, which can lead organisms to behave altruistically to their genetic relatives, works differently when-as is often the case in human societies-altruism can be boosted by social pressure. Here I present a model of social norms enforced by indirect reciprocity. In the model there are many alternative stable allocations of rewards ("distributional norms"); a stable norm is stable in the sense that each player is best off following the norm if other players do the same. Stable norms var ...[more]

PMID: 27305045

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