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Multi-echo fMRI replication sample of autobiographical memory, prospection and theory of mind reasoning tasks.

ABSTRACT: The default network is involved in self-generated thought, a class of cognition that includes autobiographical memory, prospection, and reasoning about the mental states of others. We collected a replication sample of Spreng and Grady (J Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1112-1123, 2010), confirming that the default network differentially supports each of these forms of self-generated thought. Here we describe this dataset of multi-echo fMRI data in 31 young adults during autobiographical remembering, imagining, and mentalizing; we also provide an additional resting-state scan for each subject. In this new sample, the findings from the original report are successfully replicated using the same analysis. Physiological measures were additionally collected and allow for interrogation of the impact of multi-echo independent components preprocessing both in task and rest. Future work on this dataset may provide insight into evoked brain response for cued self-generated thought, International Affective Picture System viewing, resting state dynamics, preprocessing procedures, and more. The dataset is accompanied by experimental code for independent behavioral data collection.

SUBMITTER: DuPre E

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5170594 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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