Project description:This paper aimed to contribute to answering three questions. First, how robust and reliable are early implicit measures of false belief (FB) understanding? Second, do these measures tap FB understanding rather than simpler processes such as tracking the protagonist's perceptual access? Third, do implicit FB tasks tap an earlier, more basic form of theory of mind (ToM) than standard verbal tasks? We conducted a conceptual replication of Garnham & Perner's task (Garnham and Perner 2001 Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 19, 413-432) simultaneously measuring children's anticipatory looking and interactive behaviours toward an agent with a true or FB (N = 81, M = 40 months). Additionally, we implemented an ignorance condition and a standard FB task. We successfully replicated the original findings: children's looking and interactive behaviour differed according to the agent's true or FB. However, children mostly did not differentiate between FB and ignorance conditions in various measures of anticipation and uncertainty, suggesting the use of simpler conceptual strategies than full-blown ToM. Moreover, implicit measures were all related to each other but largely not related to performance in the standard FB task, except for first look in the FB condition. Overall, our findings suggest that these implicit measures are robust but may not tap the same underlying cognitive capacity as explicit FB tasks.
Project description:The default network is involved in self-generated thought, a class of cognition that includes autobiographical memory, prospection, and reasoning about the mental states of others. We collected a replication sample of Spreng and Grady (J Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1112-1123, 2010), confirming that the default network differentially supports each of these forms of self-generated thought. Here we describe this dataset of multi-echo fMRI data in 31 young adults during autobiographical remembering, imagining, and mentalizing; we also provide an additional resting-state scan for each subject. In this new sample, the findings from the original report are successfully replicated using the same analysis. Physiological measures were additionally collected and allow for interrogation of the impact of multi-echo independent components preprocessing both in task and rest. Future work on this dataset may provide insight into evoked brain response for cued self-generated thought, International Affective Picture System viewing, resting state dynamics, preprocessing procedures, and more. The dataset is accompanied by experimental code for independent behavioral data collection.
Project description:A complete understanding of the cognitive systems underwriting theory of mind (ToM) abilities requires articulating how mental state representations are generated and processed in everyday situations. Individuals rarely announce their intentions prior to acting, and actions are often consistent with multiple mental states. In order for ToM to operate effectively in such situations, mental state representations should be generated in response to certain actions, even when those actions occur in the presence of mental state content derived from other aspects of the situation. Results from three experiments with preschool children and adults demonstrate that mental state information is indeed generated based on an approach action cue in situations that contain competing mental state information. Further, the frequency with which participants produced or endorsed explanations that include mental states about an approached object decreased when the competing mental state information about a different object was made explicit. This set of experiments provides some of the first steps toward identifying the observable action cues that are used to generate mental state representations in everyday situations and offers insight into how both young children and adults processes multiple mental state representations.
Project description:Theory of mind (ToM) encompasses a range of abilities that show different developmental time courses. However, relatively little work has examined the neural correlates of ToM during early childhood. In this study, we investigated the neural correlates of ToM in typically developing children aged 4-8 years using resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging. We calculated whole-brain functional connectivity with the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ), a core region involved in ToM, and examined its relation to children's early, basic, and advanced components of ToM competence assessed by a parent-report measure. Total ToM and both basic and advanced ToM components, but not early, consistently showed a positive correlation with connectivity between RTPJ and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus; advanced ToM was also correlated with RTPJ to left TPJ connectivity. However, early and advanced ToM components showed negative correlation with the right inferior/superior parietal lobe, suggesting that RTPJ network differentiation is also related to ToM abilities. We confirmed and extended these results using a Bayesian modeling approach demonstrating significant relations between multiple nodes of the mentalizing network and ToM abilities, with no evidence for differences in relations between ToM components. Our data provide new insights into the neural correlates of multiple aspects of ToM in early childhood and may have implications for both typical and atypical development of ToM.
Project description:IntroductionThe relationship between neural social cognition patterns and performance on social cognition tasks in daily life is a topic of debate, with key consideration given to the extent to which theory of mind (ToM) brain circuits share properties reflecting everyday social functioning. To test the efficacy of ecological stimuli in eliciting brain activation within the ToM brain circuits, we adapted the Edinburgh Social Cognition test social scenarios, consisting of dynamic ecological contextually embedded social stimuli, to a fMRI paradigm.MethodsForty-two adults (21 men, mean age ± SD = 34.19 years ±12.57) were enrolled and underwent an fMRI assessment which consisted of a ToM task using the Edinburgh Social Cognition test scenarios. We used the same stimuli to prompt implicit (movie viewing) and explicit (silent and two-choice answers) reasoning on cognitive and affective mental states. The fMRI analysis was based on the classical random effect analysis. Group inferences were complemented with supplemental analyses using overlap maps to assess inter-subject variability.ResultsWe found that explicit mentalizing reasoning yielded wide neural activations when two-choice answers were used. We also observed that the nature of ToM reasoning, that is, affective or cognitive, played a significant role in activating different neural circuits.DiscussionThe ESCoT stimuli were particularly effective in evoking ToM core neural underpinnings and elicited executive frontal loops. Future work may employ the task in a clinical setting to investigate ToM network reorganization and plasticity.
Project description:The current study examined how ingroup and outgroup Theory of Mind (ToM) predicts children's and adolescents' reasoning for their acceptability judgments of intergroup bullying of Syrian refugee peers and group support of intergroup bullying. Participants included 587 Turkish middle (n = 372, M age = 12.19, SD = 1.01; 208 girls) and high school (n = 215, M age = 14.81, SD = 0.97; 142 girls) students. Participants read a bias-based bullying story with a Syrian refugee peer targeted by an ingroup Turkish peer. Then, participants rated the acceptability of bullying and group support of bullying and were presented with a reasoning question (Why?) after each acceptability question (bullying and group support of bullying). Reasoning codes included Fairness, Refugee Status/War, Prejudice and Discrimination, Harm, Prescriptive Norms, Group Functioning, and Relationship with the Bully. Participants' ingroup and outgroup ToM abilities (measured using the Strange Stories) were evaluated as predictors of reasoning. Results documented that middle school students were more likely to attribute mental states to their ingroup members compared to outgroup members while high school students' ToM performance did not differ across contexts. Further, the more unacceptable participants judged bullying to be, the more they reasoned about the bullying by referencing fairness, refugee status, discrimination, and harm. Results also documented that ingroup and outgroup ToM were positively related to attribution to fairness and participants' usage of multiple reasoning judgments while only outgroup ToM was a significant predictor of reasoning around refugee status/war, discrimination, and prejudice. The findings provide implications for intervention programs that tackle intergroup bullying by examining bystanders' social cognitive skills in a specific context.
Project description:Many psychological theories posit foundational links between two fundamental constructs: (1) our ability to produce, perceive, and represent action; and (2) our ability to understand the meaning and motivation behind the action (i.e. Theory of Mind; ToM). This position is contentious, however, and long-standing competing theories of social-cognitive development debate roles for basic action-processing in ToM. Developmental research is key to investigating these hypotheses, but whether individual differences in neural and behavioral measures of motor action relate to social-cognitive development is unknown. We examined 3- to 5-year-old children's (N = 26) EEG mu-desynchronization during production of object-directed action, and explored associations between mu-desynchronization and children's behavioral motor skills, behavioral action-representation abilities, and behavioral ToM. For children with high (but not low) mu-desynchronization, motor skill related to action-representation abilities, and action-representation mediated relations between motor skill and ToM. Results demonstrate novel foundational links between action-processing and ToM, suggesting that basic motor action may be a key mechanism for social-cognitive development, thus shedding light on the origins and emergence of higher social cognition.
Project description:Lay abstractConversation is a key part of everyday social interactions. Previous studies have suggested that conversational skills are related to theory of mind, the ability to think about other people's mental states, such as beliefs, knowledge, and emotions. Both theory of mind and conversation are common areas of difficulty for autistic people, yet few studies have investigated how people, including autistic people, use theory of mind during conversation. We developed a new way of measuring cToM using two rating scales: cToM Positive captures behaviors that show consideration of a conversation partner's mental states, such as referring to their thoughts or feelings, whereas cToM Negative captures behaviors that show a lack of theory of mind through violations of neurotypical conversational norms, such as providing too much, too little, or irrelevant information. We measured cToM in 50 pairs of autistic and typically developing children (ages 8-16 years) during 5-min "getting to know you" conversations. Compared to typically developing children, autistic children displayed more frequent cToM Negative behaviors but very similar rates of cToM Positive behaviors. Across both groups, cToM Negative (but not Positive) ratings were related to difficulties in recognizing emotions from facial expressions and a lower tendency to talk about others' mental states spontaneously (i.e., without being instructed to do so), which suggests that both abilities are important for theory of mind in conversation. Altogether, this study highlights both strengths and difficulties among autistic individuals, and it suggests possible avenues for further research and for improving conversational skills.
Project description:The earliest stages in our perception of the world have a subtle but powerful influence on later thought processes; they provide the contextual cues within which our thoughts are framed and they adapt to many different environments throughout our lives. Understanding the changes in these cues is crucial to understanding how our perceptual ability develops, but these changes are often difficult to quantify in sufficiently complex tasks where objective measures of development are available. Here we simulate perceptual learning using neural networks and demonstrate fundamental changes in these cues as a function of skill. These cues are cognitively grouped together to form perceptual templates that enable rapid 'whole scene' categorisation of complex stimuli. Such categories reduce the computational load on our capacity limited thought processes, they inform our higher cognitive processes and they suggest a framework of perceptual pre-processing that captures the central role of perception in expertise.
Project description:Lateral intraparietal (LIP) neurons represent formation of perceptual decisions involving eye movements. In circuit models for these decisions, neural ensembles that encode actions compete to form decisions. Consequently, representation and readout of the decision variables (DVs) are implemented similarly for decisions with identical competing actions, irrespective of input and task context differences. Further, DVs are encoded as partially potentiated action plans through balance of activity of action-selective ensembles. Here, we test those core principles. We show that in a novel face-discrimination task, LIP firing rates decrease with supporting evidence, contrary to conventional motion-discrimination tasks. These opposite response patterns arise from similar mechanisms in which decisions form along curved population-response manifolds misaligned with action representations. These manifolds rotate in state space based on context, indicating distinct optimal readouts for different tasks. We show similar manifolds in lateral and medial prefrontal cortices, suggesting similar representational geometry across decision-making circuits.