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Evaluating community health centers' adoption of a new global capitation payment (eCHANGE) study protocol.

ABSTRACT: Primary care patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) are an effective healthcare delivery model. Evidence regarding the most effective payment models for increased coordination efforts is sparse. This protocol paper describes the evaluation of an Alternative Payment Methodology (APM) implemented in a subset of Oregon community health centers (CHCs), using a prospective matched observational design. The APM is a primary care payment reform intervention that changed Oregon's Medicaid payment for several CHCs from fee-for-service reimbursement to a per-member-per-month capitated payment. We will implement a difference-in-difference analytic approach to evaluate pre-post APM changes between intervention and control groups, including: 1) clinic-level outcomes, 2) patient-level clinical outcomes, and 3) patient-level econometric outcomes. Findings from the project will be of national significance, as there is a need for evidence regarding how novel payment methods might enhance PCMH capabilities and support their capacity to produce better quality and outcomes. If this capitated payment method is proven effective, study findings will inform dissemination of similar APMs nationwide.

SUBMITTER: Angier H

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5267970 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Evaluating community health centers' adoption of a new global capitation payment (eCHANGE) study protocol.

Angier H H O'Malley J P JP Marino M M McConnell K J KJ Cottrell E E Jacob R L RL Likumahuwa-Ackman S S Heintzman J J Huguet N N Bailey S R SR DeVoe J E JE

Contemporary clinical trials 20161109

Primary care patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) are an effective healthcare delivery model. Evidence regarding the most effective payment models for increased coordination efforts is sparse. This protocol paper describes the evaluation of an Alternative Payment Methodology (APM) implemented in a subset of Oregon community health centers (CHCs), using a prospective matched observational design. The APM is a primary care payment reform intervention that changed Oregon's Medicaid payment for se ...[more]

PMID: 27836506

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Project description:BackgroundGhana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 applying fee-for-service method for paying NHIS-credentialed health care providers. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) later introduced diagnosis-related-grouping (DRG) payment to contain cost without much success. The NHIA then introduced capitation payment, a decision that attracted complaints of falling enrolment and renewal rates from stakeholders. This study was done to provide evidence on this trend to guide policy debate on the issue.MethodsWe applied mixed method design to the study. We did a trend analysis of NHIS membership data in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess growth rate; performed independent-sample t-test to compare sample means of the three regions and analysed data from individual in-depth interviews to determine any relationship between capitation payment and subscribers' renewal decision.ResultsResults of new enrolment data analysis showed differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p = 0.041; r = 0. 15; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r = 0. 42. Analysis of membership renewal data, however, showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), p = 0.660; r = 0.03; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 50.51, SE 9.49), p = 0.233. Analysis of both new enrolment and renewal data also showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = - 13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), p = 0.329; and between Ashanti and Central (M = - 6.47, SE 12.68), p = 0.746. However, capitation payment had some effect in Ashanti compared with Volta (r = 0. 12) and Central (r = 0. 14); but could not be sustained beyond 2012. Responses from the in-depth interviews did not also show that capitation payment is a key factor in subscribers' renewal decision.ConclusionCapitation payment had a small but unsustainable effect on membership growth rate in the Ashanti region. Factors other than capitation payment may have played a more significant role in subscribers' enrolment and renewal decisions in the Ashanti region of Ghana.

Project description:BackgroundGhana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with resistance for its perceived poor quality of care. This paper assesses National Health Insurance Scheme subscribers and care providers' perception of quality of care under the capitation payment method.MethodsThis is a cross-sectional survey of subscribers and care providers perception of quality of care in three administrative regions of Ghana using a 5-point Likert scale for the assessment based on a set of quality of care measures. We performed descriptive analysis to determine average perception of quality of care scores for each of the measures used. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were also performed to examine relationships between respondent's characteristics and their perception of quality of care.ResultsIn general, subscribers expressed positive perception about the quality of care though subscribers in Ashanti were less positive compared to those in the Central region. A chi-square analysis, however, showed significant differences in subscribers' perception of quality of care by occupation (p = 0.002), region (p = 0.007) length of NHIS membership (p = 0.006), and age (p = 0.014). Multivariate logistic regression analysis also showed that different factors, other than region of residence, were significantly associated with perceived good quality of care. Analysis of health care providers' responses also showed significant differences in their perception of quality of care by region (p = 0.001). Multivariate logistic model showed that health care providers in the Volta region (OR = 0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.58) were significantly less likely to perceive quality of care as good compared to those in the Ashanti region.ConclusionSubscribers and care providers across the three regions have relatively good perception of the quality of health care in general though subscribers in Ashanti were less positive than those in the Central region. It is, therefore, plausible that capitation payment may have influenced the relatively low perception of quality of care in the Ashanti region.

Project description:Provider payment reforms, such as capitation, are very contentious. Such reforms can drop off the policy agenda due to political and contextual resistance. Using the Shiffman and Smith (Generation of political priority for global health initiatives: a framework and case study of maternal mortality. Lancet 2007; 370 1370-9) framework, this study explains why Ghana's National Health Insurance capitation payment policy that rose onto the policy agenda in 2012, dropped off the agenda in 2017 during its pilot implementation in the Ashanti region. We conducted a retrospective qualitative policy analysis by collecting field data in December 2019 in the Ashanti region through 18 interviews with regional and district level policy actors and four focus group discussions with community-level policy beneficiaries. The thematically analysed field data were triangulated with media reports on the policy. We discovered that technically framing capitation as a cost-containment strategy with less attention on portraying its health benefits resulted in a politically negative reframing of the policy as a strategy to punish fraudulent providers and opposition party electorates. At the level of policy actors, pilot implementation was constrained by a regional level anti-policy community, weak civil society mobilization and low trust in the then political leadership. Anti-policy campaigners drew on highly contentious and poorly implemented characteristics of the policy to demand cancellation of the policy. A change in government in 2017 created the needed political window for the suspension of the policy. While it was technically justified to pilot the policy in the stronghold of the main opposition party, this decision carried political risks. Other low- and middle-income countries considering capitation reforms should note that piloting potentially controversial policies such as capitation within a politically sensitive location can attract unanticipated partisan political interest in the policy. Such partisan interest can potentially lead to a decline in political attention for the policy in the event of a change in government.

Project description:BackgroundAlternative payment models (APMs) in healthcare are emerging that reward quality of care over quantity of services. Most bundled payment programs that are described in published studies are related to episodes for a surgical inpatient hospital stay. With outpatient services, monthly capitated payments are an alternative to bundled payments for specialty services.ObjectiveTo assess the association of a capitated contractual arrangement between a primary care physician group and an oncology clinic group with the quality of care received.MethodsWe evaluated the effect of an oncology group's transition from a fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement to a partial-capitated-payment model with a primary care group. We compared outcomes for patients who received treatment after implementation of the new arrangement (ie, postcontract capitated group) with outcomes of patients receiving treatment before the change (ie, precontract capitated group). In addition, we conducted a parallel analysis of patients from a population that was not affected by the contract to assess temporal effects (ie, postcontract FFS group vs precontract FFS group). All patients were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans of a single health plan (ie, Humana), and outcomes were measured using claims data provided by that company. Patients in the 2 precontract groups received treatment between July 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011; patients in the 2 postcontract groups received treatment between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. Age- and sex-adjusted all-cause hospitalization, complications from cancer treatment, and ambulance transfers during 6 months of follow-up were evaluated.ResultsIn the population subject to the partial-capitated-payment model, the postcontract group (N = 305) was younger than the precontract group (N = 165). In a subset of patients in the 2 capitated groups who had Deyo-Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI) RxRisk scores, the postcontract capitated group had significantly higher CCI scores. Adjusted odds ratios for the postcontract capitated group versus the precontract capitated group showed no difference in the likelihood that any of the outcomes would occur. However, the mean number of chemotherapy-related complications and ambulance transports were greater postcontract. In the parallel analysis of the population not affected by the new payment arrangement, no differences were found between the pre- and postcontract groups. This suggests that temporal changes potentially affecting patients in the capitated and FFS populations would not have influenced postcontract outcomes.ConclusionsAfter the implementation of partial-capitated payments for medical oncology services in the oncology practice, the likelihood of a patient experiencing at least 1 event of a specific adverse outcome did not change; however, the average number of some adverse events did increase, which may in part be explained by a higher level of underlying morbidity in the postcontract group. The overall findings of this study suggest that quality of care was not compromised in this APM.

Dataset Information

Evaluating community health centers' adoption of a new global capitation payment (eCHANGE) study protocol.

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Evaluating community health centers' adoption of a new global capitation payment (eCHANGE) study protocol.

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