Preferences for moral vs. immoral traits in others are conditional.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Melnikoff DE
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5789924 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Immoral behavior often consists of weighing transgression of a moral norm against maximizing personal profits. One important question is to understand why immoral behaviors vary based on who receives specific benefits and what are the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying such moral flexibility. Here, we used model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how immoral behaviors change when benefiting oneself or someone else. Participants were presented with offers requiring a tradeoff between a moral cost (i.e. profiting a morally bad cause) and a benefit for either oneself or a charity. Participants were more willing to obtain ill-gotten profits for themselves than for a charity, driven by a devaluation of the moral cost when deciding for their own interests. The subjective value of an immoral offer, computed as a linear summation of the weighed monetary gain and moral cost, recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) regardless of beneficiaries. Moreover, paralleling the behavioral findings, this region enhanced its functional coupling with mentalizing-related regions while deciding whether to gain morally tainted profits for oneself vs charity. Finally, individual differences in moral preference differentially modulated choice-specific signals in the dorsolateral PFC according to who benefited from the decisions. These findings provide insights for understanding the neurobiological basis of moral flexibility.
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Project description:We have a social preference to reduce inequity in the outcomes between oneself and others. Such a preference varies according to others. We performed functional magnetic resonance imaging during an economic game to investigate how the perceived moral traits of others modulate the neural activities that underlie inequity-aversion. The participants unilaterally allocated money to three partners (good, neutral, and bad). During presentation of the good and neutral partners, the anterior region of the rostral medial frontal cortex (arMFC) showed increased functional connectivity with the caudate head and the anterior insula, respectively. Following this, participants allocated more money to the good partner, and less to the bad partner, compared with the neutral partner. The caudate head and anterior insula showed greater activation during fair allocation to the good and unfair allocation to the neutral partners, respectively. However, these regions were silent during allocations to the bad partner. Therefore, the arMFC-caudate/insula circuit encompasses distinct neural processes that underlie inequity-aversion in monetary allocations that the different moral traits of others can modulate.
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Project description:Moral preferences pervade many aspects of our lives, dictating how we ought to behave, whom we can marry, and even what we eat. Despite their relevance, one fundamental question remains unanswered: Where do individual moral preferences come from? It is often thought that all types of preferences reflect properties of domain-general neural decision mechanisms that employ a common "neural currency" to value choice options in many different contexts. This view, however, appears at odds with the observation that many humans consider it intuitively wrong to employ the same scale to compare moral value (e.g., of a human life) with material value (e.g., of money). In this paper, we directly test if moral subjective values are represented by similar neural processes as financial subjective values. In a study combining fMRI with a novel behavioral paradigm, we identify neural representations of the subjective values of human lives or financial payoffs by means of structurally identical computational models. Correlating isomorphic model variables from both domains with brain activity reveals specific patterns of neural activity that selectively represent values in the moral (rTPJ) or financial (vmPFC) domain. Intriguingly, our findings show that human lives and money are valued in (at least partially) distinct neural currencies, supporting theoretical proposals that human moral behavior is guided by processes that are distinct from those underlying behavior driven by personal material benefit.
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Project description:Recent work has distinguished "harm" from "purity" violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but also its target (e.g., oneself versus another). Across two experiments, common signatures of harm and purity tracked with other-directed and self-directed actions, respectively. First, participants judged self-directed acts as primarily impure and other-directed acts as primarily harmful. Second, conservatism predicted harsher judgments of self-directed but not other-directed acts. Third, while participants delivered harsher judgments of intentional versus accidental acts, this effect was smaller for self-directed than other-directed acts. Finally, participants judged self-directed acts more harshly when focusing on the actor's character versus the action itself; other-directed acts elicited the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that moral domains are defined not only by the kind of action but also by the target of the action.
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