Collapse and rescue of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Akcay E
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6043585 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Collapse and rescue of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks.
Nature communications 20180712 1
The evolutionary dynamics of social traits depend crucially on the social structure of a population. The effects of social structure on social behaviors are well-studied, but relatively little is known about how social structure itself coevolves with social traits. Here, I study such coevolution with a simple yet realistic model of within-group social structure where social connections are either inherited from a parent or made randomly. I show that cooperation evolves when individuals make few ...[more]
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