Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Galbiati R
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6298117 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Dec
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation.
Galbiati Roberto R Henry Emeric E Jacquemet Nicolas N
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 20181119 49
In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a laboratory experiment, that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: (<i>i</i>) Past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate, and (<i>ii</i>) when fines for noncooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher le ...[more]
Similar Datasets
Project description:The social norms of fairness and reciprocity are fundamental to cooperation and constitute core behavioral principles. Warm glow theory suggests that cooperative behavior is driven by positive emotions, whereas inequity aversion theory proposes that cooperative behavior is necessary to avoid negative feelings. However, the precise characteristics underlying the enforcement (fairness or reciprocity) and violation (unfairness or betrayal) of cooperation remain elusive. Moreover, whether the neural mechanism of cooperation as a partner or a spectator is the same remains unclear. To resolve the above issues, we summarized the findings of human cooperation neuroimaging studies through a meta-analysis. Based on our results, cooperation enforcement activates reward-related brain areas, such as the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, only during other-cooperation. In contrast, cooperation violation is associated with the negative emotion-related insula in both self- and other-noncooperation. Thus, people expect others to cooperate rather than themselves; however, people are disgusted when cooperation is violated by themselves or others. Taken together, cooperative behavior might be mainly driven by a process designed to avoid negative emotion, which supports the inequity aversion theory but not the warm glow theory, thereby improving our understanding of cooperation theory.
| S-EPMC6917027 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The threat of free-riding makes the marshalling of cooperation from group members a fundamental challenge of social life. Where classical social science theory saw the enforcement of moral boundaries as a critical way by which group members regulate one another's self-interest and build cooperation, moral judgments have most often been studied as processes internal to individuals. Here we investigate how the interpersonal expression of positive and negative moral judgments encourages cooperation in groups and prosocial behavior between group members. In a laboratory experiment, groups whose members could make moral judgments achieved greater cooperation than groups with no capacity to sanction, levels comparable to those of groups featuring costly material sanctions. In addition, members of moral judgment groups subsequently showed more interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity than all other groups. These findings extend prior work on peer enforcement, highlighting how the enforcement of moral boundaries offers an efficient solution to cooperation problems and promotes prosocial behavior between group members.
| S-EPMC5314330 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
| S-EPMC4657016 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner's dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner's dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer.
| S-EPMC3437882 | biostudies-other
Project description:Both reciprocity and positive assortment (like with like) are predicted to promote the evolution of cooperation, yet how partners influence each other's behaviour within dynamic networks is not well understood. One way to test this question is to partition phenotypic variation into differences among individuals in the expression of cooperative behaviour (the 'direct effect'), and plasticity within individuals in response to the social environment (the 'indirect effect'). A positive correlation between these two sources of variation, such that more cooperative individuals elicit others to cooperate, is predicted to facilitate social contagion and selection on cooperative behaviour. Testing this hypothesis is challenging, however, because it requires repeated measures of behaviour across a dynamic social landscape. Here, we use an automated data-logging system to quantify the behaviour of 179 wire-tailed manakins, birds that form cooperative male-male coalitions, and we use multiple-membership models to test the hypothesis that dynamic network partnerships shape within-individual variation in cooperative behaviour. Our results show strong positive correlations between a bird's own sociality and his estimated effect on his partners, consistent with the hypothesis that cooperation begets cooperation. These findings support the hypothesis that social contagion can facilitate selection for cooperative behaviour within social networks.
| S-EPMC6304062 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Humans' propensity to cooperate is driven by our embeddedness in social networks. A key mechanism through which networks promote cooperation is clustering. Within clusters, conditional cooperators are insulated from exploitation by noncooperators, allowing them to reap the benefits of cooperation. Dynamic networks, where ties can be shed and new ties formed, allow for the endogenous emergence of clusters of cooperators. Although past work suggests that either reputation processes or network dynamics can increase clustering and cooperation, existing work on network dynamics conflates reputations and dynamics. Here we report results from a large-scale experiment (total n = 2,675) that embedded participants in clustered or random networks that were static or dynamic, with varying levels of reputational information. Results show that initial network clustering predicts cooperation in static networks, but not in dynamic ones. Further, our experiment shows that while reputations are important for partner choice, cooperation levels are driven purely by dynamics. Supplemental conditions confirmed this lack of a reputation effect. Importantly, we find that when participants make individual choices to cooperate or defect with each partner, as opposed to a single decision that applies to all partners (as is standard in the literature on cooperation in networks), cooperation rates in static networks are as high as cooperation rates in dynamic networks. This finding highlights the importance of structured relations for sustained cooperation, and shows how giving experimental participants more realistic choices has important consequences for whether dynamic networks promote higher levels of cooperation than static networks.
| S-EPMC5798352 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects' cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation.
| S-EPMC3228461 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The evolutionary dynamics of social traits depend crucially on the social structure of a population. The effects of social structure on social behaviors are well-studied, but relatively little is known about how social structure itself coevolves with social traits. Here, I study such coevolution with a simple yet realistic model of within-group social structure where social connections are either inherited from a parent or made randomly. I show that cooperation evolves when individuals make few random connections, but the presence of cooperation selects for increased rates of random connections, which leads to its collapse. Inherent costs of social connections can prevent this negative feedback, but these costs can negate some or all of the aggregate benefits of cooperation. Exogenously maintained social inheritance can mitigate the latter problem and allow cooperation to increase the average fitness of a population. These results illustrate how coevolutionary dynamics can constrain the long-term persistence of cooperation.
| S-EPMC6043585 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Individuals in pain are motivated to be cooperative in social interaction. Yet, there has been little research on how pain dynamically affects cooperation at a neural level. The present study investigated the cooperative behavior under acute physical pain by asking dyads to complete three blocks of button-press cooperative task, while neural activities were recorded simultaneously on each subject by the fNIRS-based hyperscanning. Results showed that individuals in pain improved their cooperation rate across task blocks. Accordingly, increased interpersonal neural synchronization (INS) was found at the left prefrontal cortex in second block, whereas increased INS was found at the right prefrontal cortex and the right parietal cortex in third block compared to the first block. Moreover, the change of INS in right parietal cortex was positively correlated with subjective pain rating in the pain treatment group. In addition, dynamic interpersonal neural networks were identified in painful condition with increasing frontoparietal networks across time. By uncovering dissociative neural processes involved in how pain affects cooperation in social interaction, the present work provides the first interbrain evidence to highlight the sociality of pain on social interaction in perspective of motivational aspect of pain.
| S-EPMC6865469 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This paper investigates cooperation games in which poor agents do not benefit from cooperation with wealthy agents. They instead benefit from considering wealth relative to decision payoffs of fitness or wealth. Of concern is the effect of cooperation on participants, their rational self-interest and choices, and not the evolution of cooperation directly. The accumulation of fitness or wealth has been shown in the literature to lead to different optimal strategies for wealthy and poor players in Chicken games. The effect could have important explanatory power if it were more broadly applicable. First we empirically compare two published results, one involving the temptation parameter vs. degree of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma, and the other a surprising result from a public goods game with participants from different cultures, networks and wealth in which a fixed rather than relative payoff scheme was used. Using the temptation data to calibrate the public goods behavior suggests wealth factors can provide an explanation for the results. Second we show using simulation that adding a survival threshold to a wealth or fitness accumulating Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma produces a wealth relative effect. We clarify previous results to show the poor must avoid survival risk, regardless of whether this is associated with cooperation or defection. We do this by introducing the Farmer's Game, a simulation of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with wealth accumulation and a survival threshold. This is used to evaluate the Tit-for-Tat strategy and four variants. Equilibrium payoffs keep the game scaled to social relevance, with a fraction of all payoffs externalized as a turn cost parameter. Findings include poor performance of Tit-for-Tat near the survival threshold, superior performance of low risk strategies for both poor and wealthy players, dependence of survival of the poor near the threshold on Tit-for-Tat forgiveness, unexpected optimization of forgiveness without encountering a social dilemma, improved performance of a diverse mix of strategies, and a more abrupt threshold of social catastrophe for the better performing mix. Lastly we compare cooperating and non-cooperating societies using the simulation and discover disturbing connections between cooperation and familiar non-egalitarian wealth distribution patterns.
| S-EPMC6909069 | biostudies-literature