A bargaining experiment on heterogeneity and side deals in climate negotiations.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Gosnell G
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6991966 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Climate negotiation outcomes are difficult to evaluate objectively because there are no clear reference scenarios. Subjective assessments from those directly involved in the negotiations are particularly important, as this may influence strategy and future negotiation participation. Here we analyze the perceived success of the climate negotiations in a sample of more than 600 experts involved in international climate policy. Respondents were pessimistic when asked for specific assessments of the current approach centered on voluntary pledges, but were more optimistic when asked for general assessments of the outcomes and usefulness of the climate negotiations. Individuals who are more involved in the negotiation process tended to be more optimistic, especially in terms of general assessments. Our results indicate that two reinforcing effects are at work: a high degree of involvement changes individuals' perceptions and more optimistic individuals are more inclined to remain involved in the negotiations.
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Project description:We consider complex multistage multiagent negotiation processes such as those occurring at climate conferences and ask ourselves how can an agent maximize its social power, intended as influence over the outcome of the negotiation. This question can be framed as a strategic game played over an opinion dynamics model, in which the action of an agent consists in stubbornly defending its own opinion. We show that for consensus-seeking opinion dynamics models in which the interaction weights are uniform, the optimal action obeys to an early mover advantage principle, i.e. the agents behaving stubbornly in the early phases of the negotiations achieve the highest social power. When looking at data collected from the climate change negotiations going on at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we find evidence of the use of the early mover strategy. Furthermore, we show that the social powers computed through our model correlate very well with the perceived leadership roles assessed through independent survey data, especially when non-uniform weights incorporating economical and demographic factors are considered.
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Project description:International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29-49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced.
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Project description:We undertook two vignette studies to examine the role of affect (trait and state) and bargaining power on initiating negotiations, an often overlooked stage of the negotiation process. Using a job negotiation opportunity, we examine three distinct phases of the initiation process-engaging a counterpart, making a request, and optimizing a request. Study 1 examines the effects of two affect dispositions (happiness and sadness), under power asymmetry (low vs. high bargaining power), on the three initiation behaviors. We found that power is pivotal to the decision to engage, request, and optimize. Also, sadness reduces the likelihood of initiation when power is high but is immaterial when power is low. In contrast, individuals who tend to be happy can reverse the adverse effect of powerlessness on requesting, but not on engaging and optimizing. However, happiness does not carry over a positive effect on negotiation initiation, over and above that of power. Study 2 investigated the role of trait affect when individuals are in power asymmetry and when they are induced with sadness or happiness. We found that those with a happy disposition initiate more (engage, request, and optimize) when power is high and experience incidental sadness. Overall, these findings qualify previous research on negotiation initiation and highlight the importance of trait affect and its interaction with state affect as additional driving forces and of power as a boundary condition. "for the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratio to mistakes at the other stages." (trans.Aristotle, 1944, 1303b).
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Project description:BACKGROUND:The necessity to measure and reward "value for money" of new pharmaceuticals has become central in health policy debates, as much as the requirement to assess the "willingness to pay" for an additional, quality-adjusted life year (QALY). There is a clear need to understand the capacity of "value-based" pricing policies to impact societal goals, like timely access to new treatments, sustainable health budgets, or incentivizing research to improve patient outcomes. Not only the pricing mechanics, but also the process of value assessment and price negotiation are subject to reform demands. This study assesses the impact of a negotiation situation for life-extending pharmaceuticals on societal outcomes. Of interest were general effects of the bargaining behaviour, as well as differences caused by the assigned role and the magnitude of prices. METHODS:We ran an online experiment (n?=?404) on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were randomly assigned into four treatment groups for a reimbursement negotiation between two roles (health minister, pharma representative) in two price framings. Payoff to players consisted of a fixed salary and a potential bonus, depending on their preferences, their price offer and the counter offer of a randomly paired negotiation partner. Success had real social consequences on other MTurk users (premium payers, investors) and via donations to a patient association. RESULTS:Margins between reservation prices and price offers increased throughout the game. Yet, 47% of players reduced at least once and 15% always their bonus probability to zero in favour of an agreement. 61% of simulated negotiation pairs could have reached an agreement, based on their preferences. 63% of these were successful, leaving 61% of patients with no access to the new treatment. The group with "real world" prices had lower prices and less agreements than the unconverted payoff group. The successful markets redistributed 20% of total assets from premium payers to investors over five innovation cycles. CONCLUSIONS:The negotiation situation for pharmaceutical reimbursement has notable impact on societal outcomes. Further research should evaluate policies that align preferences and increase negotiation success.
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Project description:The high prices of innovative medicines endanger access to care worldwide. Sustainable prices need to be affordable while sufficiently incentivizing research and development (R&D) investments. A proposed solution is increased transparency. Proponents argue that price and R&D cost confidentiality are drivers of high prices. On the contrary, supporters of confidentiality claim that confidentiality enables targeted discounts which make treatments affordable; moreover, pharmaceutical companies argue that R&D investments would suffer with more transparency. Despite the political relevance, limited empirical evidence exists on the effects of transparency regulations. We contribute to fill this gap with an experiment where we replicate the EU pharmaceutical market in a laboratory setting. In a randomized controlled study, we analyzed how participants, 400 students located in four European countries, negotiated in the current system of Price Secrecy in comparison with innovative bargaining settings where either prices only (Price Transparency) or prices and R&D costs (Full Transparency) were made transparent to buyers. We found that Price transparency had no statistically significant effect on average prices or number of patients treated and made R&D investments significantly smaller (-16.86%; P: 0.0024). On the other hand, Full Transparency reduced prices (-26%; P: 0.0004) and held the number of patients constant at the level of Price Secrecy. It produced price convergence between countries with low and high health budgets, and, despite lower prices, had no effect on R&D investments. Our findings provide novel evidence that combining price and R&D cost transparency could be an effective policy to contribute to sustainable medicine prices. See related article by Franzen et al. (Cancer Discov 2022;12:299-302).
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Project description:[Figure: see text].
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Project description:Language is critical to coordination in groups. Though, how language affects coordination in groups is not well understood. We prime distributive and integrative language in a bargaining experiment to better understand the links between group outcomes and communication. We accomplish this by priming interests or positions language in randomized groups. We find that priming positions as opposed to interests language leads to agreements where controllers, subjects with unilateral authority over the group outcome, receive a larger share of the benefits but where the total benefits to the group are unaffected. In contrast to common justifications for the use of integrative language in bargaining, our experimental approach revealed no significant differences between priming interests and positions language in regards to increasing joint outcomes for the groups. Across treatments, we find subjects that use gain frames and make reference to visuals aids during bargaining experience larger gains for the group, while loss frames and pro-self language experience larger gains for the individual through side payments. This finding suggests a bargainer's dilemma: whether to employ language that claims a larger share of group's assets or employ language to increase joint gains.
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