Dataset Information

Influences of a Luck Game on Offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Is There a Mediation of Emotions?

ABSTRACT: The ultimatum (UG) and dictator (DG) games are two tasks where a sum of money has to be divided between two players: a proposer and a receiver. Following the rational choice theory, proposers should offer the minimum in the UG and nothing in the DG, due to the presence/absence of the receivers' bargaining power. The fact that people generally make non-negligible offers in both games has suggested divergent explicative hypotheses and has generated extensive research to examine exogenous and endogenous factors underlying such decisions. Among the contextual factors affecting the proposers' offers, the sense of entitlement or of ownership has been shown to reduce offers significantly. A frequent way to induce the sense of entitlement/ownership has been to assign the role of proposer to the player who apparently has better scored in skill tasks executed before the UG or DG or has more contributed, through a previous luck game, to the amount to be shared. Such manipulations, however, could produce a possible overlapping between "ownership" and "merit," that in this study we aimed to disentangle. We manipulated the participants' initial endowment through a luck game, by increasing, decreasing or leaving it unchanged, to investigate whether winnings or losses by chance influenced offers in UG and DG in similar or different ways depending on their respective features. All participants played as proposers but this role was apparently random and disconnected from the outcomes of the luck game. Furthermore, we investigated whether the putative effect of experimental manipulation was mediated by the changes in emotions elicited by the luck game and/or by the emotions and beliefs related to decision-making. We used a non-economic version of the games, in which tokens were divided instead of money. In the study, 300 unpaid undergraduates (M = 152) from different degree programs, aged between 18 and 42 years, participated. The results revealed that the effect of outcome manipulation on offers was moderated by the specific structure of the UG and DG. Instead, emotional reactions barely mediated the effect of the experimental manipulation, suggesting that their role in those decisions is less relevant than is assumed in the literature.

SUBMITTER: Matarazzo O

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7008780 | biostudies-literature | 2020

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Influences of a Luck Game on Offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Is There a Mediation of Emotions?

Matarazzo Olimpia O Pizzini Barbara B Greco Claudia C

Frontiers in psychology 20200203

The ultimatum (UG) and dictator (DG) games are two tasks where a sum of money has to be divided between two players: a proposer and a receiver. Following the rational choice theory, proposers should offer the minimum in the UG and nothing in the DG, due to the presence/absence of the receivers' bargaining power. The fact that people generally make non-negligible offers in both games has suggested divergent explicative hypotheses and has generated extensive research to examine exogenous and endog ...[more]

PMID: 32116888

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Project description:Does religion promote prosocial behaviour? Despite numerous publications that seem to answer this question affirmatively, divergent results from recent meta-analyses and pre-registered replication efforts suggest that the issue is not yet settled. Uncertainty lingers around (i) whether the effects of religious cognition on prosocial behaviour were obtained through implicit cognitive processes, explicit cognitive processes or both and (ii) whether religious cognition increases generosity only among people disinclined to share with anonymous strangers. Here, we report two experiments designed to address these concerns. In Experiment 1, we sought to replicate Shariff and Norenzayan's demonstration of the effects of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers to anonymous strangers; unlike Shariff and Norenzayan, however, we used an online environment where anonymity was virtually assured. In Experiment 2, we introduced a 'taking' option to allow greater expression of baseline selfishness. In both experiments, we sought to activate religious cognition implicitly and explicitly, and we investigated the possibility that religious priming depends on the extent to which subjects view God as a punishing, authoritarian figure. Results indicated that in both experiments, religious subjects transferred more money on average than did non-religious subjects. Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis that implicit religious priming did not increase Dictator Game transfers in either experiment, even among religious subjects. Collectively, the two experiments furnished support for a small but reliable effect of explicit priming, though among religious subjects only. Neither experiment supported the hypothesis that the effect of religious priming depends on viewing God as a punishing figure. Finally, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, we found that the overall effect of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers was small and did not statistically differ from zero.

Project description:Participants in the Ultimatum Game will often reject unfair resource allocations at personal cost, reflecting a trade-off between financial gain and maintenance of social standing. Although this rejection behavior is linked to executive control, the exact role of cognitive regulation in relation to status cues is unclear. We propose that the salience of status cues affects how cognitive regulation resolves the conflict between financial gain and social status considerations. Situations that tax executive control by limiting available cognitive resources should increase acceptance rates for unfair offers, particularly when the conflict between economic self-interest and social reputation is high. Here, participants rated their own subjective social status, and then either mentally counted (Load) or ignored (No Load) simultaneously-presented tones while playing two rounds of the Ultimatum Game with an online (sham) "Proposer" of either high or low social status. A logistic regression revealed an interaction of Proposer status with cognitive load. Compared to the No Load group, the Load group showed higher acceptance rates for unfair offers from the high-status Proposer. In contrast, cognitive load did not influence acceptance rates for unfair offers from the low-status Proposer. Additionally, Proposer status interacted with the relative social distance between participant and Proposer. Participants close in social distance to the high-status Proposer were more likely to accept the unfair offer than those farther in social distance, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for offers from the low-status Proposer. Although rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game has previously been conceptualized as an intuitive response, these results instead suggest it reflects a deliberative strategy, dependent on cognitive resources, to prioritize social standing over short-term financial gain. This study reveals the dynamic interplay of cognitive resources and status concerns within this paradigm, providing new insights into when and why people reject inequitable divisions of resources.

Dataset Information

Influences of a Luck Game on Offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Is There a Mediation of Emotions?

Publications

Influences of a Luck Game on Offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Is There a Mediation of Emotions?

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