Impact of uncertainty and ambiguous outcome phrasing on moral decision-making.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Shou Y
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7250437 | biostudies-literature | 2020
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Impact of uncertainty and ambiguous outcome phrasing on moral decision-making.
Shou Yiyun Y Olney Joel J Smithson Michael M Song Fei F
PloS one 20200526 5
The literature has shown that different types of moral dilemmas elicit discrepant decision patterns. The present research investigated the role of uncertainty in contributing to these decision patterns. Two studies were conducted to examine participants' choices in commonly used dilemmas. Study 1 showed that participants' perceived outcome probabilities were significantly associated with their moral choices, and that these associations were independent from the dilemma type. Study 2 revealed tha ...[more]
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