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Unveiling the Effectiveness of Agency Cost and Firms' Size as Moderators Between CSR Disclosure and Firms' Growth.

ABSTRACT: The excellence of corporate governance in companies lies in their ability to adopt the corporate social responsibility (CSR), which enhances their growth. This study examines the effect of agency cost, firm size, and CSR disclosure on the firms' growth. Specifically, the study analyzed the agency cost and firms' size as the moderators that influence the firms' performance asymmetrically. In its approach, the study compiled data of 300 Pakistani listed companies, which have a significant concern with CSR for the period 2010-2018. Using the 2SLS and GMM instrumental panel regressions, our empirical results show that the agency cost is detrimental to the firms' growth. In contrast, the firms' size boosts the firms' growth. Moreover, the growth of firms with leverage declines and the presence of independent directors improves the firms' growth.

SUBMITTER: Akram A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7438580 | biostudies-literature | 2020

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Unveiling the Effectiveness of Agency Cost and Firms' Size as Moderators Between CSR Disclosure and Firms' Growth.

Akram Aswad A Tang Yingkai Y Tariq Jasim J

Frontiers in psychology 20200813

The excellence of corporate governance in companies lies in their ability to adopt the corporate social responsibility (CSR), which enhances their growth. This study examines the effect of agency cost, firm size, and CSR disclosure on the firms' growth. Specifically, the study analyzed the agency cost and firms' size as the moderators that influence the firms' performance asymmetrically. In its approach, the study compiled data of 300 Pakistani listed companies, which have a significant concern ...[more]

PMID: 32903572

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Project description:In France, veterinarians can both prescribe and deliver veterinary medicines, which is a questionable situation from the perspective of antimicrobial use (AMU) reduction to avoid antimicrobial resistance (AMR). This situation places veterinarians in direct commercial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry as purchase contracts are signed between veterinarians and pharmaceutical companies. The aim of the present work is to analyse the relationships between veterinarians and pharmaceutical firms in the oligopoly market context of French veterinary medicine to determine whether the prescription behaviour of practitioners can be biased by joint prescription and delivery. Therefore, we develop an analysis based on principal-agent theory. Contracts between pharmaceutical companies and veterinarians during the 2008-2014 period were analysed based on 382 contracts related to 47 drugs belonging to eight main pharmaceutical firms (2320 observations). The price per unit after rebate of each drug and contract was calculated. The descriptive analysis demonstrated high disparity among the contracts across pharmaceutical firms with regard to the provisions of the contracts and how they are presented. Then, linear regression was used to explain the price per unit after rebate based on the explanatory variables, which included the yearly purchase objective, year, type of drug and type of rebate. The decrease in price per unit after rebate for each extra €1000 purchase objective per drug category was established to be €0.061 per 100 kg body weight for anticoccidiosis treatments, €0.029 per 100 kg body weight for anti-inflammatories, €0.0125 per 100 kg body weight and €0.0845 per animal for antiparasitics, and €0.031 per animal for intramammary antimicrobials. Applying agency theory reveals that veterinarians can be considered agents in the case of monopolistic situations involving pharmaceutical firms; otherwise, veterinarians are considered principals (oligopolistic situations in which at least several medicines have similar indications). The present study does not provide evidence suggesting that joint prescription and delivery may introduce any potential prescription bias linked to conflicts of interest under the market conditions during the 2008-2014 period.

Project description:BACKGROUND:Value of information is now recognized as a reference method in the decision process underpinning cost-effectiveness evaluation. The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) is the expected value from completely reducing the uncertainty surrounding the cost-effectiveness of an innovative intervention. Among sample size calculation methods used in cost-effectiveness studies, only one is coherent with this decision framework. It uses a Bayesian approach and requires data of a pre-existing cost-effectiveness study to derive a valid prior EVPI. When evaluating the cost-effectiveness of innovations, no observed prior EVPI is usually available to calculate the sample size. We here propose a sample size calculation method for cost-effectiveness studies, that follows the value of information theory, and, being frequentist, can be based on assumptions if no observed prior EVPI is available. METHODS:The general principle of our method is to define the sampling distribution of the incremental net monetary benefit (?B), or the distribution of ?B that would be observed in a planned cost-effectiveness study of size n. Based on this sampling distribution, the EVPI that would remain at the end of the trial (EVPIn) is estimated. The optimal sample size of the planned cost-effectiveness study is the n for which the cost of including an additional participant becomes equal or higher than the value of the information gathered through this inclusion. RESULTS:Our method is illustrated through four examples. The first one is used to present the method in depth and describe how the sample size may vary according to the parameters' value. The three other examples are used to illustrate in different situations how the sample size may vary according to the ceiling cost-effectiveness ratio, and how it compares with a test statistic-based method. We developed an R package (EBASS) to run these calculations. CONCLUSIONS:Our sample size calculation method follows the value of information theory that is now recommended for analyzing and interpreting cost-effectiveness data, and sets the size of a study that balances its cost and the value of its information.

Dataset Information

Unveiling the Effectiveness of Agency Cost and Firms' Size as Moderators Between CSR Disclosure and Firms' Growth.

Publications

Unveiling the Effectiveness of Agency Cost and Firms' Size as Moderators Between CSR Disclosure and Firms' Growth.

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