Value-Based Provider Payment Initiatives Combining Global Payments With Explicit Quality Incentives: A Systematic Review.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Cattel D
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7536531 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Dec
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Value-Based Provider Payment Initiatives Combining Global Payments With Explicit Quality Incentives: A Systematic Review.
Cattel Daniëlle D Eijkenaar Frank F
Medical care research and review : MCRR 20190619 6
An essential element in the pursuit of value-based health care is provider payment reform. This article aims to identify and analyze payment initiatives comprising a specific manifestation of value-based payment reform that can be expected to contribute to value in a broad sense: (a) global base payments combined with (b) explicit quality incentives. We conducted a systematic review of the literature, consulting four scientific bibliographic databases, reference lists, the Internet, and experts. ...[more]
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