Inclusive groups can avoid the tragedy of the commons.

ABSTRACT: The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243-1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.

SUBMITTER: Hintze A 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7769990 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature