Lapses in perceptual decisions reflect exploration.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Pisupati S
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7846276 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Jan
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Lapses in perceptual decisions reflect exploration.
Pisupati Sashank S Chartarifsky-Lynn Lital L Khanal Anup A Churchland Anne K AK
eLife 20210111
Perceptual decision-makers often display a constant rate of errors independent of evidence strength. These 'lapses' are treated as a nuisance arising from noise tangential to the decision, e.g. inattention or motor errors. Here, we use a multisensory decision task in rats to demonstrate that these explanations cannot account for lapses' stimulus dependence. We propose a novel explanation: lapses reflect a strategic trade-off between exploiting known rewarding actions and exploring uncertain ones ...[more]
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