Local Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Lineage B.1.1.7, Brazil, December 2020.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Claro IM
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7920684 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:The emergence of diverse lineages harboring mutations with functional significance and potentially enhanced transmissibility imposes an increased difficulty on the containment of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic [...].
| S-EPMC8230136 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The B.1.1.7 (Alpha) variant has been detected in Mumbai, India during February 2021. Subsequently, we retrieved 43 sequences from specimens of 51 COVID-19 cases from Mumbai. The sequence analysis revealed that the cases were mainly affected with Alpha variant which suggests its role in community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Mumbai, India.
| S-EPMC8563497 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveThis study aimed to investigate coronavirus disease (COVID-19) epidemiology in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, Canada.MethodsUsing data through December 1, 2020, we estimated time-varying reproduction number, Rt, using EpiEstim package in R, and calculated incidence rate ratios (IRR) across the 3 provinces.ResultsIn Ontario, 76% (92 745/121 745) of cases were in Toronto, Peel, York, Ottawa, and Durham; in Alberta, 82% (49 878/61 169) in Calgary and Edmonton; in British Columbia, 90% (31 142/34 699) in Fraser and Vancouver Coastal. Across 3 provinces, Rt dropped to ≤ 1 after April. In Ontario, Rt would remain < 1 in April if congregate-setting-associated cases were excluded. Over summer, Rt maintained < 1 in Ontario, ~1 in British Columbia, and ~1 in Alberta, except early July when Rt was > 1. In all 3 provinces, Rt was > 1, reflecting surges in case count from September through November. Compared with British Columbia (684.2 cases per 100 000), Alberta (IRR = 2.0; 1399.3 cases per 100 000) and Ontario (IRR = 1.2; 835.8 cases per 100 000) had a higher cumulative case count per 100 000 population.ConclusionsAlberta and Ontario had a higher incidence rate than British Columbia, but Rt trajectories were similar across all 3 provinces.
| S-EPMC8134904 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This study aims at providing estimates on the transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 in schools and day-care centres. We calculated secondary attack rates (SARs) using individual-level data from state-wide mandatory notification of index cases in educational institutions, followed by contact tracing and PCR-testing of high-risk contacts. From August to December 2020, every sixth of overall 784 independent index cases was associated with secondary cases in educational institutions. Monitoring of 14 594 institutional high-risk contacts (89% PCR-tested) of 441 index cases during quarantine revealed 196 secondary cases (SAR 1.34%, 0.99-1.78). SARS-CoV-2 infection among high-risk contacts was more likely around teacher-indexes compared to student-/child-indexes (incidence rate ratio (IRR) 3.17, 1.79-5.59), and in day-care centres compared to secondary schools (IRR 3.23, 1.76-5.91), mainly due to clusters around teacher-indexes in day-care containing a higher mean number of secondary cases per index case (142/113 = 1.26) than clusters around student-indexes in schools (82/474 = 0.17). In 2020, SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk in educational settings was low overall, but varied strongly between setting and role of the index case, indicating the chance for targeted intervention. Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in educational institutions can powerfully inform public health policy and improve educational justice during the pandemic.
| S-EPMC8503068 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Airborne transmission, a term combining both large droplet and aerosol transmission, is thought to be the main transmission route of SARS-CoV-2. Here we investigated the relative efficiency of aerosol transmission of two variants of SARS-CoV-2, B.1.1.7 (alpha) and lineage A, in the Syrian hamster. A novel transmission caging setup was designed and validated, which allowed the assessment of transmission efficiency at various distances. At 2 meters distance, only particles <5 µm traversed between cages. In this setup, aerosol transmission was confirmed in 8 out of 8 (N = 4 for each variant) sentinels after 24 hours of exposure as demonstrated by respiratory shedding and seroconversion. Successful transmission occurred even when exposure time was limited to one hour, highlighting the efficiency of this transmission route. Interestingly, the B.1.1.7 variant outcompeted the lineage A variant in an airborne transmission chain after mixed infection of donors. Combined, this data indicates that the infectious dose of B.1.1.7 required for successful transmission may be lower than that of lineage A virus. The experimental proof for true aerosol transmission and the increase in the aerosol transmission potential of B.1.1.7 underscore the continuous need for assessment of novel variants and the development or preemptive transmission mitigation strategies.
| S-EPMC8328059 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Airborne transmission, a term combining both large droplet and aerosol transmission, is thought to be the main transmission route of SARS-CoV-2. Here we investigated the relative efficiency of aerosol transmission of two variants of SARS-CoV-2, B.1.1.7 (alpha) and lineage A, in the Syrian hamster. A novel transmission caging setup was designed and validated, which allowed the assessment of transmission efficiency at various distances. At 2 meters distance, only particles <5 µm traversed between cages. In this setup, aerosol transmission was confirmed in 8 out of 8 (N = 4 for each variant) sentinels after 24 hours of exposure as demonstrated by respiratory shedding and seroconversion. Successful transmission occurred even when exposure time was limited to one hour, highlighting the efficiency of this transmission route. Interestingly, the B.1.1.7 variant outcompeted the lineage A variant in an airborne transmission chain after mixed infection of donors. Combined, this data indicates that the infectious dose of B.1.1.7 required for successful transmission may be lower than that of lineage A virus. The experimental proof for true aerosol transmission and the increase in the aerosol transmission potential of B.1.1.7 underscore the continuous need for assessment of novel variants and the development or preemptive transmission mitigation strategies.
| S-EPMC8366800 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundReported COVID-19 cases underestimate SARS-CoV-2 infections. We conducted a national probability survey of US households to estimate the cumulative incidence adjusted for antibody waning.MethodsFrom August-December 2020, a multistage random sample of US addresses were mailed a survey and materials to self-collect nasal swabs and dried blood spots. One adult household member completed the survey and mail specimens for viral detection with PCR and total (IgA, IgM, IgG) nucleocapsid antibody by a commercial, EUA-approved antigen capture assay. We estimated cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 adjusted for waning antibodies and calculated reported fraction and infection fatality ratio (IFR). Differences in seropositivity among demographic, geographic and clinical subgroups were explored with weighted prevalence ratios (PR).ResultsAmong 39,500 sampled households, 4,654 respondents provided responded. Cumulative incidence adjusted for waning was 11.9% (95% credible interval (CrI): 10.5-13.5%) as of October 30, 2020. We estimated 30,332,842 (CrI: 26,703,753- 34,335,338) total infections in the U.S. adult population by October 30, 2020. Reported fraction was 17% and IFR was 0.85% among adults. Non-Hispanic Black (PR: 2.2) and Hispanic (PR: 3.1) persons were more likely than White non-Hispanic to be seropositive, as were those living in metropolitan areas (PR: 2.5).ConclusionsOne in 8 US adults had been infected with SARS-CoV-2 by late October 2020; but few had been accounted for in public health reporting. The scope of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely substantially underestimated by reported cases. Disparities in COVID-19 by race observed among reported cases cannot be attributed to differential diagnosis or reporting of infections in some population subgroups.
| S-EPMC8406864 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundThe secondary attack rate (SAR) of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) was estimated, and the risk factors for infection among members of households with a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) index case were identified to inform preventive measures.MethodsBetween 3 August and 19 December 2020, a household transmission study was implemented based on a standardized World Health Organization protocol. Laboratory-confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection were recruited through the federal COVID-19 database. Trained contact tracers interviewed index cases and household members to collect information on demographic, clinical and behavioural factors. Contacts were followed up for 28 days to identify secondary infections. SAR was estimated and odds ratios (OR) were calculated for risk factors for transmission.ResultsIn total, 383 households and 793 contacts were included in this study. The overall SAR was 17% [95% confidence interval (CI) 14-21]. Contacts had higher risk for infection if the primary case had both cough and runny nose (OR 4.31, 95% CI 1.60-11.63), if the contact was aged 18-49 years (OR 4.67, 95% CI 1.83-11.93), if the contact kissed the primary case (OR 3.16, 95% CI 1.19-8.43), or if the contact shared a meal with the primary case (OR 3.10, 95% CI 1.17-8.27).ConclusionsThese results add to the global literature by providing evidence from a middle-income setting. Standard preventive measures in households with positive cases remain critical to reduce transmission.
| S-EPMC8479489 | biostudies-literature
Project description:IntroductionThe SARS-CoV-2 lineages carrying the amino acid change D614G have become the dominant variants in the global COVID-19 pandemic. By June 2021, all the emerging variants of concern carried the D614G mutation. The rapid spread of the G614 mutant suggests that it may have a transmission advantage over the D614 wildtype.AimOur objective was to estimate the transmission advantage of D614G by integrating phylogenetic and epidemiological analysis.MethodsWe assume that the mutation D614G was the only site of interest which characterised the two cocirculating virus strains by June 2020, but their differential transmissibility might be attributable to a combination of D614G and other mutations. We define the fitness of G614 as the ratio of the basic reproduction number of the strain with G614 to the strain with D614 and applied an epidemiological framework for fitness inference to analyse SARS-CoV-2 surveillance and sequence data.ResultsUsing this framework, we estimated that the G614 mutant is 31% (95% credible interval: 28-34) more transmissible than the D614 wildtype. Therefore, interventions that were previously effective in containing or mitigating the D614 wildtype (e.g. in China, Vietnam and Thailand) may be less effective against the G614 mutant.ConclusionOur framework can be readily integrated into current SARS-CoV-2 surveillance to monitor the emergence and fitness of mutant strains such that pandemic surveillance, disease control and development of treatment and vaccines can be adjusted dynamically.
| S-EPMC8662801 | biostudies-literature