Neuronal correlates of strategic cooperation in monkeys.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Ong WS
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7929784 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Group-beneficial behaviors have presented a long-standing challenge for evolutionary theory because, although their benefits are available to all group members, their costs are borne by individuals. Consequently, an individual could benefit from "cheating" their group mates by not paying the costs while still reaping the benefits. There have been many proposed evolutionary mechanisms that could favor cooperation (and disfavor cheating) in particular circumstances. However, if cooperation is still favored in some circumstances, then we might expect evolution to favor strategic cooperation, where the level of contribution toward group-beneficial behavior is varied in response to the social context. To uncover how and why individuals should contribute toward group-beneficial behavior across social contexts, we model strategic cooperation as an evolutionary game where players can quantitatively adjust the amount they contribute toward group-beneficial behavior. We find that the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) predicts, unsurprisingly, that players should contribute in relation to their relatedness to the group. However, we surprisingly find that players often contribute to cooperation in such a way that their fitness is inverse to their relatedness to the group such that those that contribute to cooperation end up with the same return from group-beneficial behavior, essentially removing any potential advantage of higher relatedness. These results bring to light a paradox of group-beneficial cooperation: groups do best when they contain highly related individuals, but those with the highest relatedness to the group will often have the lowest fitness within the group.
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Project description:Humans may cooperate strategically, cooperating at higher levels than expected from their short-term interests, to try and stimulate others to cooperate. To test this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated the extent an individual's behaviour is known to others, and hence whether or not strategic cooperation is possible. In contrast with many previous studies, we avoided confounding factors by preventing individuals from learning during the game about either pay-offs or about how other individuals behave. We found clear evidence for strategic cooperators-just telling some individuals that their groupmates would be informed about their behaviour led to them tripling their initial level of cooperation, from 17 to 50%. We also found that many individuals play as if they do not understand the game, and their presence obscures the detection of strategic cooperation. Identifying such players allowed us to detect and study strategic motives for cooperation in novel, more powerful, ways.
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Project description:Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from nonkin). To better understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ?Collective Investment" game, which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the level of relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating relatedness (genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, which builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. Measurements of stalk investment by natural strains correspond to the predicted patterns of relatedness-dependent strategic investment, wherein investment by a strain increases with its relatedness to the group. Furthermore, if overall group relatedness is relatively low (i.e., no strain is at high frequency in a group) strains face a scenario akin to the "Prisoner's Dilemma" and suffer from insufficient collective investment. We find that strains employ relatedness-dependent segregation to avoid these pernicious conditions. These findings demonstrate that simple organisms like D. discoideum are not restricted to being ?cheaters" or ?cooperators" but instead measure their relatedness to their group and strategically modulate their investment into cooperation accordingly. Consequently, all individuals will sometimes appear to cooperate and sometimes cheat due to the dynamics of strategic investing.
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Project description:Although human and animal behaviors are largely shaped by reinforcement and punishment, choices in social settings are also influenced by information about the knowledge and experience of other decision-makers. During competitive games, monkeys increased their payoffs by systematically deviating from a simple heuristic learning algorithm and thereby countering the predictable exploitation by their computer opponent. Neurons in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) signaled the animal's recent choice and reward history that reflected the computer's exploitative strategy. The strength of switching signals in the dmPFC also correlated with the animal's tendency to deviate from the heuristic learning algorithm. Therefore, the dmPFC might provide control signals for overriding simple heuristic learning algorithms based on the inferred strategies of the opponent.
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Project description:To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people's beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people's beliefs about simple world facts is the first-order attribution while going further to reason people's beliefs about the minds of others is the second-order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high-order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential-move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal-subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high-order reasoning as compared with low-order reasoning. At the decision stage, high-order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high-order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high-order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision-making.
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Project description:Competing successfully against an intelligent adversary requires the ability to mentalize an opponent's state of mind to anticipate his/her future behavior. Although much is known about what brain regions are activated during mentalizing, the question of how this function is implemented has received little attention to date. Here we formulated a computational model describing the capacity to mentalize in games. We scanned human subjects with functional MRI while they participated in a simple two-player strategy game and correlated our model against the functional MRI data. Different model components captured activity in distinct parts of the mentalizing network. While medial prefrontal cortex tracked an individual's expectations given the degree of model-predicted influence, posterior superior temporal sulcus was found to correspond to an influence update signal, capturing the difference between expected and actual influence exerted. These results suggest dissociable contributions of different parts of the mentalizing network to the computations underlying higher-order strategizing in humans.
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Project description:We used functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate human mental processes in a competitive interactive setting--the "beauty contest" game. This game is well-suited for investigating whether and how a player's mental processing incorporates the thinking process of others in strategic reasoning. We apply a cognitive hierarchy model to classify subject's choices in the experimental game according to the degree of strategic reasoning so that we can identify the neural substrates of different levels of strategizing. According to this model, high-level reasoners expect the others to behave strategically, whereas low-level reasoners choose based on the expectation that others will choose randomly. The data show that high-level reasoning and a measure of strategic IQ (related to winning in the game) correlate with the neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex, demonstrating its crucial role in successful mentalizing. This supports a cognitive hierarchy model of human brain and behavior.
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Project description:Games from experimental economics have provided insights into the evolutionary roots of social decision making in primates and other species. Multiple primate species' abilities to cooperate, coordinate and anti-coordinate have been tested utilizing variants of these simple games. Past research, however, has focused on species known to cooperate and coordinate in the wild. To begin to address the degree to which cooperation and coordination may be a general ability that manifests in specific contexts, the present study assessed the decisions of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis; N = 10), a species not known for their cooperative behavior in these games. Pairs of monkeys were presented with the Assurance Game (a coordination game), the Hawk-Dove Game (an anti-coordination game) and the Prisoner's Dilemma (a cooperation game with a temptation to defect). We then compared squirrel monkeys' performance to existing data on capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a closely related species that routinely cooperates, to determine what, if any, differences in decision making emerged. Some pairs of both species found the payoff-dominant Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the coordination game, but failed to find the NE in subsequent games. Our results suggest that, like capuchins, squirrel monkeys coordinate their behavior with others, suggesting that such mutual outcomes occur in at least some contexts, even in species that do not routinely cooperate.
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Project description:Background and objectivesCellular reprogramming in regenerative medicine holds great promise for treating patients with neurological disorders. In this regard, small molecule-mediated cellular conversion has attracted special attention because of its ease of reproducibility, applicability, and fewer safety concerns. However, currently available protocols for the direct conversion of somatic cells to neurons are limited in clinical application due of their complex nature, lengthy process, and low conversion efficiency.Methods and resultsHere, we report a new protocol involving chemical-based direct conversion of human fibroblasts (HF) to matured neuron-like cells with a short duration and high conversion efficiency using temporal and strategic dual epigenetic regulation. In this protocol, epigenetic modulation by inhibition of histone deacetylase and bromodomain enabled to overcome "recalcitrant" nature of adult fibroblasts and shorten the duration of neuronal reprogramming. We further observed that an extended epigenetic regulation is necessary to maintain the induced neuronal program to generate a homogenous population of neuron-like cells.ConclusionsTherefore, our study provides a new protocol to produce neurons-like cells and highlights the need of proper epigenetic resetting to establish and maintain neuronal program in HF.
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