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Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe.

ABSTRACT: Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from nonkin). To better understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ?Collective Investment" game, which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the level of relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating relatedness (genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, which builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. Measurements of stalk investment by natural strains correspond to the predicted patterns of relatedness-dependent strategic investment, wherein investment by a strain increases with its relatedness to the group. Furthermore, if overall group relatedness is relatively low (i.e., no strain is at high frequency in a group) strains face a scenario akin to the "Prisoner's Dilemma" and suffer from insufficient collective investment. We find that strains employ relatedness-dependent segregation to avoid these pernicious conditions. These findings demonstrate that simple organisms like D. discoideum are not restricted to being ?cheaters" or ?cooperators" but instead measure their relatedness to their group and strategically modulate their investment into cooperation accordingly. Consequently, all individuals will sometimes appear to cooperate and sometimes cheat due to the dynamics of strategic investing.

SUBMITTER: Madgwick PG

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6003509 | biostudies-literature | 2018 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe.

Madgwick Philip G PG Stewart Balint B Belcher Laurence J LJ Thompson Christopher R L CRL Wolf Jason B JB

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 20180507 21

Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from nonkin). To better understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we de ...[more]

PMID: 29735672

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Project description:The global stress response controlled by the alternative sigma factor RpoS protects enteric bacteria from a variety of environmental stressors. The role of RpoS in other, nonenteric bacteria, such as the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, is less well understood. Here, we employed experimental social evolution to reveal that cooperative behavior via secreted public goods is an important function in the RpoS response of P. aeruginosa Using whole-genome sequencing, we identified rpoS loss-of-function mutants among isolates evolved in a protein growth medium that requires extracellular proteolysis. We found that rpoS mutants comprise up to 25% of the evolved population and that they behave as social cheaters, with low fitness in isolation but high fitness in mixed culture with the cooperating wild type. We conclude that rpoS mutants cheat because they exploit an RpoS-controlled public good produced by the wild type, the secreted aminopeptidase PaAP, and because they do not carry the metabolic costs of expressing PaAP and many other gene products in the large RpoS regulon. Our results suggest that PaAP is an integral part of a proteolytic sequence in P. aeruginosa that permits the utilization of protein as a nutrient source. Our work broadens the scope of stress response functions in bacteria.IMPORTANCE Bacterial stress responses are generally considered protective measures taken by individual cells. Enabled by an experimental evolution approach, we describe a contrasting property, collective nutrient acquisition, in the RpoS-dependent stress response of the opportunistic human pathogen P. aeruginosa Specifically, we identify the secreted P. aeruginosa aminopeptidase (PaAP) as an essential RpoS-controlled function in extracellular proteolysis. As a secreted "public good," PaAP permits cheating by rpoS mutants that save the metabolic costs of expressing RpoS-controlled genes dispensable under the given growth conditions. Proteolytic enzymes are important virulence factors in P. aeruginosa pathogenesis and constitute a potential target for antimicrobial therapy. More broadly, our work contributes to recent findings in higher organisms that stress affects not only individual fitness and competitiveness but also cooperative behavior.

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Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe.

Publications

Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe.

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