Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings
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ABSTRACT: Supplementary Information
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-021-09705-y.
SUBMITTER: Lange A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7945615 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Mar
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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