Project description:OBJECTIVE:To examine relationships between penalties assessed by Medicare's Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing Program and hospital financial condition. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING:Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, American Hospital Association, and Area Health Resource File data for 4,824 hospital-year observations. STUDY DESIGN:Bivariate and multivariate analysis of pooled cross-sectional data. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:Safety net hospitals have significantly higher HRRP/VBP penalties, but, unlike nonsafety net hospitals, increases in their penalty rate did not significantly affect their total margins. CONCLUSIONS:Safety net hospitals appear to rely on nonpatient care revenues to offset higher penalties for the years studied. While reassuring, these funding streams are volatile and may not be able to compensate for cumulative losses over time.
Project description:OBJECTIVEThe financial incentives for hospitals to improve care may be weaker if higher insurer payments for adverse conditions offset a portion of hospital costs. The purpose of this study was to simulate incentives for reducing hospital-acquired infections under various payment configurations by Medicare, Medicaid, and private payers.DESIGNMatched case-control study.SETTINGA large, urban hospital system with 1 community hospital and 2 tertiary-care hospitals.PATIENTSAll patients discharged in 2013 and 2014.METHODSUsing electronic hospital records, we identified hospital-acquired bloodstream infections (BSIs) and urinary tract infections (UTIs) with a validated algorithm. We assessed excess hospital costs, length of stay, and payments due to infection, and we compared them to those of uninfected patients matched by propensity for infection.RESULTSIn most scenarios, hospitals recovered only a portion of excess HAI costs through increased payments. Patients with UTIs incurred incremental costs of $6,238 (P<.01), while payments increased $1,901 (P<.05) at public diagnosis-related group (DRG) rates. For BSIs, incremental costs were $15,367 (P<.01), while payments increased $7,895 (P<.01). If private payers reimbursed a 200% markup over Medicare DRG rates, hospitals recovered 55% of costs from BSI and UTI among private-pay patients and 54% for BSI and 33% for UTI, respectively, across all patients. Under per-diem payment for private patients with no markup, hospitals recovered 71% of excess costs of BSI and 88% for UTI. At 150% markup and per-diem payments, hospitals profited.CONCLUSIONSHospital incentives for investing in patient safety vary by payer and payment configuration. Higher payments provide resources to improve patient safety, but current payment structures may also reduce the willingness of hospitals to invest in patient safety.Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2018;39:509-515.
Project description:ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to examine variation in hospital responses to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid's expansion of allowable secondary diagnoses in January 2011 and its association with financial penalties under the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP).Data sources/study settingMedicare administrative claims for discharges between July 2008 and June 2011 (N=3102 hospitals).Research designWe examined hospital variation in response to the expansion of secondary diagnoses by describing changes in comorbidity coding before and after the policy change. We used random forest machine learning regression to examine hospital characteristics associated with coded severity. We then used a 2-part model to assess whether variation in coded severity was associated with readmission penalties.ResultsChanges in severity coding varied considerably across hospitals. Random forest models indicated that greater baseline levels of condition categories, case-mix index, and hospital size were associated with larger changes in condition categories. Hospital coding of an additional condition category was associated with a nonsignificant 3.8 percentage point increase in the probability for penalties under the HRRP (SE=2.2) and a nonsignificant 0.016 percentage point increase in penalty amount (SE=0.016).ConclusionChanges in patient coded severity did not affect readmission penalties.
Project description:Safety-net hospitals rely on disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments to help cover uncompensated care costs and underpayments by Medicaid (known as Medicaid shortfalls). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) anticipates that insurance expansion will increase safety-net hospitals' revenues and will reduce DSH payments accordingly. We examined the impact of the ACA's Medicaid DSH reductions on California public hospitals' financial stability by estimating how total DSH costs (uncompensated care costs and Medicaid shortfalls) will change as a result of insurance expansion and the offsetting DSH reductions. Decreases in uncompensated care costs resulting from the ACA insurance expansion may not match the act's DSH reductions because of the high number of people who will remain uninsured, low Medicaid reimbursement rates, and medical cost inflation. Taking these three factors into account, we estimate that California public hospitals' total DSH costs will increase from $2.044 billion in 2010 to $2.363-$2.503 billion in 2019, with unmet DSH costs of $1.381-$1.537 billion.
Project description:Health systems continue to grow in size. Financial integration-the ownership of hospitals or physician practices-often has anticompetitive effects that contribute to the higher prices for health care seen in the US. To determine whether the potential harms of financial integration are counterbalanced by improvements in quality, we surveyed nationally representative samples of hospitals (n = 739) and physician practices (n = 2,189), stratified according to whether they were independent or were owned by complex systems, simple systems, or medical groups. The surveys included nine scales measuring the level of adoption of diverse, quality-focused care delivery and payment reforms. Scores varied widely across hospitals and practices, but little of this variation was explained by ownership status. Quality scores favored financially integrated systems for four of nine hospital measures and one of nine practice measures, but in no case favored complex systems. Greater financial integration was generally not associated with better quality.
Project description:ImportanceThe Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) is a value-based payment program focused on safety events. Prior studies have found that the program disproportionately penalizes safety-net hospitals, which may perform more poorly because of unmeasured severity of illness rather than lower quality. A similar program, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, stratifies hospitals into 5 peer groups for evaluation based on the proportion of their patients dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, but the effect of stratification on the HACRP is unknown.ObjectiveTo characterize the hospitals penalized by the HACRP and the distribution of financial penalties before and after stratification.Design, setting, and participantsThis economic evaluation used publicly available data on HACRP performance and penalties merged with hospital characteristics and cost reports. A total of 3102 hospitals participating in the HACRP in fiscal year 2020 (covering data from July 1, 2016, to December 31, 2018) were studied.ExposuresHospitals were divided into 5 groups based on the proportion of patients dually enrolled, and penalties were assigned to the lowest-performing quartile of hospitals in each group rather than the lowest-performing quartile overall.Main outcomes and measuresPenalties in the prestratification vs poststratification schemes.ResultsThe study identified 3102 hospitals evaluated by the HACRP. Safety-net hospitals received $111 333 384 in penalties before stratification compared with an estimated $79 087 744 after stratification-a savings of $32 245 640. Hospitals less likely to receive penalties after stratification included safety-net hospitals (33.6% penalized before stratification vs 24.8% after stratification, Δ = -8.8 percentage points [pp], P < .001), public hospitals (34.1% vs 30.5%, Δ = -3.6 pp, P = .003), hospitals in the West (26.8% vs 23.2%, Δ = -3.6 pp, P < .001), hospitals in Medicaid expansion states (27.3% vs 25.6%, Δ = -1.7 pp, P = .003), and hospitals caring for the most patients with disabilities (32.2% vs 28.3%, Δ = -3.9 pp, P < .001) and from racial/ethnic minority backgrounds (35.1% vs 31.5%, Δ = -3.6 pp, P < .001). In multivariate analyses, safety-net status and treating patients with highly medically complex conditions were associated with higher odds of moving from penalized to nonpenalized status.Conclusions and relevanceThis economic evaluation suggests that stratification of hospitals would be associated with a narrowing of disparities in penalties and a marked reduction in penalties for safety-net hospitals. Policy makers should consider adopting stratification for the HACRP.
Project description:ImportanceMedicare began paying for medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) at opioid treatment programs (OTPs) that dispense methadone and other MOUD in January 2020. There has been little research describing the response to this payment change and whether it resulted in more patients receiving MOUD or just a shift in who pays for this care.ObjectiveTo describe how many and which Medicare beneficiaries receive care from OTPs and how this compares to those receiving MOUD in other settings.Design, setting, and participantsThis cross-sectional study included all patients receiving MOUD care identified in 2019-2022 100% US Medicare Parts B and D claims. Patients receiving care in an OTP who were dually insured with Medicare and Medicaid in the 2019-2020 Transformed Medicaid Statistical Information System were also included.ExposureReceiving MOUD care in an OTP.Main outcomes and measuresComparisons of 2022 beneficiaries treated in OTPs vs other non-OTP settings in 2022.ResultsThe share of Medicare beneficiaries treated by OTPs rose steadily from 4 per 10 000 (14 160 beneficiaries) in January 2020 to 7 per 10 000 (25 596 beneficiaries) in August 2020, then plateaued through December 2022; of 38 870 patients (23% ≥66 years; 35% female) treated at an OTP in 2022, 96% received methadone. Patients in OTPs, compared to those receiving MOUD in other settings, were more likely be 65 years and younger (65% vs 62%; P < .001), less likely to be White (72% vs 82%; P < .001), and more likely to be an urban resident (86% vs 74%; P < .001). When Medicare OTP coverage began, there was no associated drop in the number of dually insured patients with Medicaid with an OTP claim. Of the 1854 OTPs, 1115 (60%) billed Medicare in 2022, with the share billing Medicare ranging from 13% to 100% across states.Conclusions and relevanceThis study showed that since the initiation of Medicare OTP coverage in 2020, there has been a rapid increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries with claims for OTP services for MOUD, and most OTPs have begun billing Medicare. Patients in OTPs were more likely to be urban residents and members of racial or ethnic minority groups than the patients receiving other forms of MOUD.
Project description:The Affordable Care Act's Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) penalizes hospitals based on excess readmission rates among Medicare beneficiaries. The aim of the program is to reduce readmissions while aligning hospitals' financial incentives with payers' and patients' quality goals. Many evidence-based interventions that reduce readmissions, such as discharge preparation, care coordination, and patient education, are grounded in the fundamentals of basic nursing care. Yet inadequate staffing can hinder nurses' efforts to carry out these processes of care. We estimated the effect that nurse staffing had on the likelihood that a hospital was penalized under the HRRP. Hospitals with higher nurse staffing had 25 percent lower odds of being penalized compared to otherwise similar hospitals with lower staffing. Investment in nursing is a potential system-level intervention to reduce readmissions that policy makers and hospital administrators should consider in the new regulatory environment as they examine the quality of care delivered to US hospital patients.
Project description:To assess the financial effect of the 2008 Hospital-Acquired Conditions Initiative (HACI) pressure ulcer payment changes on Medicare, other payers, and hospitals.Retrospective before-and-after study of all-payer statewide administrative data for more than 2.4 million annual adult discharges in 2007 and 2009 using the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Datasets for California. How often and by how much the 2008 payment changes for pressure ulcers affected hospital payment was assessed.Nonfederal acute care California hospitals (N = 311).Adults discharged from acute-care hospitals.Pressure ulcer rates and hospital payment changes.Hospital-acquired pressure ulcer rates were low in 2007 (0.28%) and 2009 (0.27%); present-on-admission pressure ulcer rates increased from 2.3% in 2007 to 3.0% in 2009. According to clinical stage of pressure ulcer (available in 2009), hospital-acquired Stage III and IV ulcers occurred in 603 discharges (0.02%); 60,244 discharges (2.42%) contained other pressure ulcer diagnoses. Payment removal for Stage III and IV hospital-acquired ulcers reduced payment in 75 (0.003%) discharges, for a statewide payment decrease of $310,444 (0.001%) for all payers and $199,238 (0.001%) for Medicare. For all other pressure ulcers, the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Initiative reduced hospital payment in 20,246 (0.81%) cases (including 18,953 cases with present-on-admission ulcers), reducing statewide payment by $62,538,586 (0.21%) for all payers and $47,237,984 (0.32%) for Medicare.The total financial effect of the 2008 payment changes for pressure ulcers was negligible. Most payment decreases occurred by removal of comorbidity payments for present-on-admission pressure ulcers other than Stages III and IV. The removal of payment for hospital-acquired Stage III and IV ulcers by implementation of the HACI policy was 1/200th that of the removal of payment for other types of pressure ulcers that occurred in implementation of the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Initiative.
Project description:ObjectiveTo measure variation in payment rates under Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and identify the main payment adjustments that drive variation.Data sources/study settingMedicare cost reports for all Medicare-certified hospitals, 1987-2013, and Dartmouth Atlas geographic files.Study designWe measure the Medicare payment rate as a hospital's total acute inpatient Medicare Part A payment, divided by the standard IPPS payment for its geographic area. We assess variation using several measures, both within local markets and nationally. We perform a factor decomposition to identify the share of variation attributable to specific adjustments. We also describe the characteristics of hospitals receiving different payment rates and evaluate changes in the magnitude of the main adjustments over time.Data collection/extraction methodsData downloaded from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Dartmouth Atlas.Principal findingsIn 2013, Medicare paid for acute inpatient discharges at a rate 31 percent above the IPPS base. For the top 10 percent of discharges, the mean rate was double the IPPS base. Variations were driven by adjustments for medical education and care to low-income populations. The magnitude of variation has increased over time.ConclusionsAdjustments are a large and growing share of Medicare hospital payments, and they create significant variation in payment rates.