Project description:BackgroundMultisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C) is a severe hyperinflammatory condition in persons aged <21 years associated with antecedent SARS-CoV-2 infection. Our objective was to describe MIS-C cases reported to CDC's national surveillance since the COVID-19 pandemic began.MethodsWe included patients meeting the MIS-C case definition with onset date from February 19, 2020 through July 31, 2021, using CDC's MIS-C case report form, which collects information on demographics, clinical presentation, and laboratory results. Trends over time across 3 MIS-C pandemic waves were assessed using Cochran-Armitage test for categorical and Jonckheere-Terpstra test for continuous variables.ResultsOf 4,901 reported cases, 4,470 met inclusion criteria. Median patient age increased over time (P<0.001), with a median of 9 years (interquartile range, 5-13 years) during the most recent (third) wave. Male predominance also increased (62% in third wave, P<0.001). A significant (P<0.001) increase in severe hematologic and gastrointestinal involvement was observed across the study period. Frequency of several cardiovascular complications (i.e., cardiac dysfunction, myocarditis, and shock/ vasopressor receipt) and renal failure declined (P<0.001). Provision of critical care including mechanical ventilation (P<0.001) and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO; P=0.046) decreased, as did duration of hospitalization and mortality (each P<0.001).ConclusionsOver the first 3 pandemic waves of MIS-C in the United States, cardiovascular complications and clinical outcomes including length of hospitalization, receipt of ECMO, and death decreased over time. These data serve as a baseline for monitoring future trends associated with SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) or other variants and increased COVID-19 vaccination among children.
Project description:The 2020-2021 epidemic with a total of 3,555 reported HPAI detections and around 22,400,000 affected poultry birds in 28 European Countries appears to be one of the largest and most devastating HPAI epidemics ever occurred in Europe. Between 24 February and 14 May 2021, 1,672 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 24 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (n=580), and in wild (n=1,051) and captive birds (n=41). The majority of the detections in poultry were reported by Poland that accounted for 297 outbreaks occurring in a densely populated poultry area over a short period of time, followed by Germany with 168 outbreaks. Germany accounted for 603 detections in wild birds, followed by Denmark and Poland with 167 and 56 detections, respectively. A second peak of HPAI-associated wild bird mortality was observed from February to April 2021 in north-west Europe. The observed longer persistence of HPAI in wild birds compared to previous years may result in a continuation of the risk for juveniles of wild birds and mammals, as well as for virus entry into poultry farms. Therefore, enhanced awareness among farmers to continue applying stringent biosecurity measures and to monitor and report increases in daily mortality and drops in production parameters, are recommended. Sixteen different genotypes were identified to date in Europe and Russia, suggesting a high propensity of these viruses to reassort. The viruses characterized to date retain a preference for avian-type receptors; however, transmission events to mammals and the identification of sporadic mutations of mammal adaptation, indicate ongoing evolution processes and possible increased ability of viruses within this clade to further adapt and transmit to mammals including humans. Since the last report, two human infections due to A(H5N6) HPAI were reported from China and Laos and 10 human cases due to A(H9N2) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus identified in China and Cambodia. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low and for occupationally exposed people low. People exposed during avian influenza outbreaks should adhere to protection measures, strictly wear personal protective equipment and get tested immediately when developing respiratory symptoms or conjunctivitis within 10 days after exposure.
Project description:New genus and species of lithistid demosponges from submarine caves in Nuku Hiva (Marquesas Islands) and Tahiti Iti (Society Islands), French Polynesia
Project description:As few data are available in the Pacific countries and territories of the Oceania region regarding nontuberculous mycobacteria,we retrospectively identified 87 such isolates from French Polynesia from 2008 to 2013 by hybridization using DNA-strip, matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) and partial rpoB gene sequencing. Partial rpoB gene sequencing classified 42/87 (48.3%) isolates in the Mycobacterium fortuitum complex, 28 (32.2%) in the Mycobacterium abscessus complex, 8 (9.2%) in the Mycobacterium mucogenicum complex, and 5 (5.7%) in the Mycobacterium avium complex. Two isolates were identified as Mycobacterium acapulcensis and Mycobacterium cosmeticum by partial 16S rRNA gene sequencing. One isolate, unidentified by MALDI-TOF MS and yielding less than 92% and 96% sequence similarity with rpoB and hsp65 reference sequences, respectively, was regarded as a potentially new species. Samples from three patients exhibiting>2 Mycobacterium porcinum isolates and from one patient with emphysema and a lung abscess exhibiting 2 Mycobacterium senegalense isolates fulfilled the American Thoracic Society microbiological criteria for nontuberculous mycobacterial lung infection.Remote geographic areas, such as French Polynesia, are potential sources for the discovery of new mycobacterial species.
Project description:In French Polynesia, the first case of SARS-CoV-2 infection was detected on March 10th, 2020, in a resident returning from France. Between March 28th and July 14th, international air traffic was interrupted and local transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was brought under control, with only 62 cases recorded. The main challenge for reopening the air border without requiring travelers to quarantine on arrival was to limit the risk of re-introducing SARS-CoV-2. Specific measures were implemented, including the obligation for all travelers to have a negative RT-PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 carried out within 3 days before departure, and to perform another RT-PCR testing 4 days after arrival. Because of limitation in available medical staff, travelers were provided a kit allowing self-collection of oral and nasal swabs. In addition to increase our testing capacity, self-collected samples from up to 10 travelers were pooled before RNA extraction and RT-PCR testing. When a pool tested positive, RNA extraction and RT-PCR were performed on each individual sample. We report here the results of COVID-19 surveillance (COV-CHECK PORINETIA) conducted between July 15th, 2020, and February 15th, 2021, in travelers using self-collection and pooling approaches. We tested 5,982 pools comprising 59,490 individual samples, and detected 273 (0.46%) travelers positive for SARS-CoV-2. A mean difference of 1.17 Ct (CI 95% 0.93-1.41) was found between positive individual samples and pools (N = 50), probably related to the volume of samples used for RNA extraction (200 μL versus 50 μL, respectively). Retrospective testing of positive samples self-collected from October 20th, 2020, using variants-specific amplification kit and spike gene sequencing, found at least 6 residents infected by the Alpha variant. Self-collection and pooling approaches allowed large-scale screening for SARS-CoV-2 using less human, material and financial resources. Moreover, this strategy allowed detecting the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in French Polynesia.
Project description:Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can emerge in areas with low poliovirus immunity and cause outbreaks* of paralytic polio (1-5). Among the three types of wild poliovirus, type 2 was declared eradicated in 2015 (1,2). The use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV; types 1, 2, and 3 Sabin strains) ceased in April 2016 via a 1-month-long, global synchronized switch to bivalent OPV (bOPV; types 1 and 3 Sabin strains) in immunization activities (1-4). Monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2; type 2 Sabin strain) is available for cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreak response immunization (1-5). The number and geographic breadth of post-switch cVDPV2 outbreaks have exceeded forecasts that trended toward zero outbreaks 4 years after the switch and assumed rapid and effective control of any that occurred (4). New cVDPV2 outbreaks have been seeded by mOPV2 use, by both suboptimal mOPV2 coverage within response zones and recently mOPV2-vaccinated children or contacts traveling outside of response zones, where children born after the global switch are fully susceptible to poliovirus type 2 transmission (2-4). In addition, new emergences can develop by inadvertent exposure to Sabin OPV2-containing vaccine (i.e., residual response mOPV2 or tOPV) (4). This report updates the January 2018-June 2019 report with information on global cVDPV outbreaks during July 2019-February 2020 (as of March 25, 2020)† (2). Among 33 cVDPV outbreaks reported during July 2019-February 2020, 31 (94%) were cVDPV2; 18 (58%) of these followed new emergences. In mid-2020, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) plans to introduce a genetically stabilized, novel OPV type 2 (nOPV2) that has a lower risk for generating VDPV2 than does Sabin mOPV2; if nOPV2 is successful in limiting new VDPV2 emergences, GPEI foresees the replacement of Sabin mOPV2 with nOPV2 for cVDPV2 outbreak responses during 2021 (2,4,6).