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An experimental look at trust, bargaining, and public goods in fishing communities.

ABSTRACT: Pro-social behavior is crucial to the sustainable governance of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Here, we investigate how key socioeconomic characteristics influence fishers' pro-social and bargaining behavior in three types of experimental economic games (public goods, trust, and trade) conducted in fishing associations in Chile. Our games revealed high levels of cooperation in the public goods game, a high degree of trust, and that sellers rather than buyers had more bargaining power, yet these results were strongly influenced by participants' socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, gender, having a secondary income source, age, and being the main income provider for the household all had a relationship to multiple game outcomes. Our results highlight that engagement in pro-social behaviors such as trust and cooperation can be influenced by people's socioeconomic context.

SUBMITTER: Rojas CA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8531345 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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An experimental look at trust, bargaining, and public goods in fishing communities.

Rojas Cristian A CA Cinner Joshua J Lau Jacqueline J Ruano-Chamorro Cristina C Contreras-Drey Francisco J FJ Gelcich Stefan S

Scientific reports 20211021 1

Pro-social behavior is crucial to the sustainable governance of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Here, we investigate how key socioeconomic characteristics influence fishers' pro-social and bargaining behavior in three types of experimental economic games (public goods, trust, and trade) conducted in fishing associations in Chile. Our games revealed high levels of cooperation in the public goods game, a high degree of trust, and that sellers rather than buyers had more bargaining power, ...[more]

PMID: 34675244

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