Prior Beliefs Modulate Projection.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Degen J
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8563063 | biostudies-literature | 2021
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Prior Beliefs Modulate Projection.
Degen Judith J Tonhauser Judith J
Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science 20210910
Beliefs about the world affect language processing and interpretation in several empirical domains. In two experiments, we tested whether subjective prior beliefs about the probability of utterance content modulate <i>projection</i>, that is, listeners' inferences about speaker commitment to that content. We find that prior beliefs predict projection at both the group and the participant level: the higher the prior belief in a content, the more speakers are taken to be committed to it. This resu ...[more]
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