Theory of Mind Following the Violation of Strong and Weak Prior Beliefs.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Kim MJ
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7786349 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Human strategic interaction requires reasoning about other people's behavior and mental states, combined with an understanding of their incentives. However, the ontogenic development of strategic reasoning is not well understood: At what age do we show a capacity for sophisticated play in social interactions? Several lines of inquiry suggest an important role for recursive thinking (RT) and theory of mind (ToM), but these capacities leave out the strategic element. We posit a strategic theory of mind (SToM) integrating ToM and RT with reasoning about incentives of all players. We investigated SToM in 3- to 9-y-old children and adults in two games that represent prevalent aspects of social interaction. Children anticipate deceptive and competitive moves from the other player and play both games in a strategically sophisticated manner by 7 y of age. One game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium: In this game, children achieve equilibrium play by the age of 7 y on the first move. In the other game, with a single mixed-strategy equilibrium, children's behavior moved toward the equilibrium with experience. These two results also correspond to two ways in which children's behavior resembles adult behavior in the same games. In both games, children's behavior becomes more strategically sophisticated with age on the first move. Beyond the age of 7 y, children begin to think about strategic interaction not myopically, but in a farsighted way, possibly with a view to cooperating and capitalizing on mutual gains in long-run relationships.
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Project description:Human success and even survival depends on our ability to predict what others will do by guessing what they are thinking. If I accelerate, will he yield? If I propose, will she accept? If I confess, will they forgive? Psychologists call this capacity "theory of mind." According to current theories, we solve this problem by assuming that others are rational actors. That is, we assume that others design and execute efficient plans to achieve their goals, given their knowledge. But if this view is correct, then our theory of mind is startlingly incomplete. Human action is not always a product of rational planning, and we would be mistaken to always interpret others' behaviors as such. A wealth of evidence indicates that we often act habitually-a form of behavioral control that depends not on rational planning, but rather on a history of reinforcement. We aim to test whether the human theory of mind includes a theory of habitual action and to assess when and how it is deployed. In a series of studies, we show that human theory of mind is sensitive to factors influencing the balance between habitual and planned behavior.
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Project description:Even though the Theory of Mind in upper primates has been under investigation for decades, how it may evolve remains an open problem. We propose here an evolutionary game theoretical model where a finite population of individuals may use reasoning strategies to infer a response to the anticipated behavior of others within the context of a sequential dilemma, i.e., the Centipede Game. We show that strategies with bounded reasoning evolve and flourish under natural selection, provided they are allowed to make reasoning mistakes and a temptation for higher future gains is in place. We further show that non-deterministic reasoning co-evolves with an optimism bias that may lead to the selection of new equilibria, closely associated with average behavior observed in experimental data. This work reveals both a novel perspective on the evolution of bounded rationality and a co-evolutionary link between the evolution of Theory of Mind and the emergence of misbeliefs.
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Project description:BackgroundThe objective of this work was to investigate the hypothesis that eukaryotic Internal Ribosome Entry Sites (IRES) lack secondary structure and to examine the generality of the hypothesis.Methodology/principal findingsIRESs of the yeast and the fruit fly are located in the 5'UTR immediately upstream of the initiation codon. The minimum folding energy (MFE) of 60 nt RNA segments immediately upstream of the initiation codons was calculated as a proxy of secondary structure stability. MFE of the reverse complements of these 60 nt segments was also calculated. The relationship between MFE and empirically determined IRES activity was investigated to test the hypothesis that strong IRES activity is associated with weak secondary structure. We show that IRES activity in the yeast and the fruit fly correlates strongly with the structural stability, with highest IRES activity found in RNA segments that exhibit the weakest secondary structure.ConclusionsWe found that a subset of eukaryotic IRESs exhibits very low secondary structure in the 5'-UTR sequences immediately upstream of the initiation codon. The consistency in results between the yeast and the fruit fly suggests a possible shared mechanism of cap-independent translation initiation that relies on an unstructured RNA segment.
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Project description:Here is reported the first study of transcriptome analyses using the Illumina HiSeq 4000 platform for three kinds of wheat (G represents Strong gluten wheat, Z represents middle gluten wheat,R represents weak gluten wheat). The variation of wheat varieties with different gluten content is mainly shown in the content of gluten, flour is divided into high gluten powder ( > 30%), medium gluten powder (26%-30%) and low gluten powder ( < 20%), according to the wet gluten content. In total, over 102.6 Gb clean reads were produced and 114, 621 unigenes were assembled; more than 59,085 unigenes had at least one significant match to an existing gene model. Differentially expressed gene analysis identified 2339 and 2600 unigenes which were expressed higher or lower among strong gluten, middle gluten and weak gluten wheat. After functional annotation and classification, three dominant pathways including protein isomerase, antioxidase activity and energy metabolism, and 410 unigenes related to gluten strength polymerization of wheat were discovered. In strong-gluten wheat, low molecular weight subunit content is higher than weak-gluten wheat, and the activity of cysteine synthase and isomerase is increased, which may promote the cross-linking of low molecular weight protein to high molecular weight protein. Meanwhile, POD enzyme strengthens gluten network and CAT enzyme affects gluten polymerization, along with higher ATPase activity, which will provides energy for protein polymerization reaction in comparison of strong-gluten wheat and weak-gluten wheat. The accuracy of these RNA-seq data was validated by qRT-PCR analysis. These data will extend our knowledge of quality characteristics of wheat and provide a theoretical foundation for molecular mechanism research of wheat.
2020-09-03 | GSE122699 | GEO