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Theory of Mind Following the Violation of Strong and Weak Prior Beliefs.

ABSTRACT: Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed differences in impression updating across social distance and group membership. Observers tend to maintain prior impressions of close (vs. distant) and ingroup (vs. outgroup) others in light of new information, and this belief maintenance is at times accompanied by increased activity in Theory of Mind regions. It remains an open question whether differences in the strength of prior beliefs, in a context absent social motivation, contribute to neural differences during belief updating. We devised a functional magnetic resonance imaging study to isolate the impact of experimentally induced prior beliefs on mentalizing activity. Participants learned about targets who performed 2 or 4 same-valenced behaviors (leading to the formation of weak or strong priors), before performing 2 counter-valenced behaviors. We found a greater change in activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right temporo-parietal junction following the violation of strong versus weak priors, and a greater change in activity in DMPFC and left temporo-parietal junction following the violation of positive versus negative priors. These results indicate that differences in neural responses to unexpected behaviors from close versus distant others, and ingroup versus outgroup members, may be driven in part by differences in the strength of prior beliefs.

SUBMITTER: Kim MJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7786349 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:Background: Several meta-analyses highlight pronounced problems in general Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other persons' mental states, in patients with psychosis in comparison to non-clinical controls. In addition, first studies suggest associations between Hyper-ToM, an exaggerated inference of mental states to others, and delusions. Research on different ToM subtypes (Cognitive ToM, Affective ToM, and Hyper-ToM) and symptom clusters of psychosis (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) have gathered conflicting findings. Thus, the present study examined group differences between patients with psychosis and non-clinical controls concerning Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM and Hyper-ToM. Further, the association between ToM subtypes and symptom clusters (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) were examined. Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 64, 1/3 with present delusions indicated by a minimum score of four in the PANSS P1 item) and non-clinical controls (n = 21) were examined with assessments of Cognitive ToM and Affective ToM abilities and Hyper-ToM errors using the Frith-Happé animations. Psychopathology was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Results: Patients with psychosis presented more pronounced problems in Cognitive and Affective ToM in comparison to non-clinical controls, whereas there were no group differences with regard to Hyper-ToM errors. Furthermore, deficits in Cognitive ToM were associated with general delusions, whereas problems in Affective ToM were associated with negative and disorganized symptoms. In addition, there was no association between Hyper-ToM errors and any symptoms when controlling for years of education. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that deficits in ToM subtypes might not be directly related to delusions and positive symptoms and are in line with more recently developed cognitive models of delusions. In addition, our results support the well-established finding of associations between ToM alterations and negative or disorganized symptoms. Our results shed light on the role of different dimensions of ToM in specific symptoms of psychosis.

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Theory of Mind Following the Violation of Strong and Weak Prior Beliefs.

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