Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Szolnoki A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4074784 | biostudies-other | 2014
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other
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