Gender and cooperation in children: experiments in Colombia and Sweden.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Cardenas JC
PROVIDER: S-EPMC3948702 | biostudies-literature | 2014
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Gender and cooperation in children: experiments in Colombia and Sweden.
Cárdenas Juan-Camilo JC Dreber Anna A von Essen Emma E Ranehill Eva E
PloS one 20140310 3
In this article we compare cooperation among Colombian and Swedish children aged 9-12. We illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by children and performed during a physical education class. We find no robust evidence of a difference in cooperation between Colombia and Sweden overall. However, Colombian girls cooperate less than Swedish girls. We also find indications that girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys. Finally, there is also a ...[more]
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