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Positive interactions may decrease cooperation in social dilemma experiments.

ABSTRACT: A social dilemma appears in the public goods problem, where the individual has to decide whether to contribute to a common resource. The total contributions to the common pool are increased by a synergy factor and evenly split among the members. The ideal outcome occurs if everyone contributes the maximum amount. However, regardless of what the others do, each individual is better off by contributing nothing. Yet, cooperation is largely observed in human society. Many mechanisms have been shown to promote cooperation in humans, alleviating, or even resolving, the social dilemma. One class of mechanisms that is under-explored is the spillover of experiences obtained from different environments. There is some evidence that positive experiences promote cooperative behaviour. Here, we address the question of how experiencing positive cooperative interactions - obtained in an environment where cooperation yields high returns - affects the level of cooperation in social dilemma interactions. In a laboratory experiment, participants played repeated public goods games (PGGs) with rounds alternating between positive interactions and social dilemma interactions. We show that, instead of promoting pro-social behaviour, the presence of positive interactions lowered the level of cooperation in the social dilemma interactions. Our analysis suggests that the high return obtained in the positive interactions sets a reference point that accentuates participants' perceptions that contributing in social dilemma interactions is a bad investment.

SUBMITTER: Wardil L

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6355953 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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