Perceptual decisions are biased by the cost to act.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Hagura N
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5319835 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Feb
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Perceptual decisions are biased by the cost to act.
Hagura Nobuhiro N Haggard Patrick P Diedrichsen Jörn J
eLife 20170221
Perceptual decisions are classically thought to depend mainly on the stimulus characteristics, probability and associated reward. However, in many cases, the motor response is considered to be a neutral output channel that only reflects the upstream decision. Contrary to this view, we show that perceptual decisions can be recursively influenced by the physical resistance applied to the response. When participants reported the direction of the visual motion by left or right manual reaching moveme ...[more]
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