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Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

ABSTRACT: Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

SUBMITTER: Shen C

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5815606 | biostudies-literature | 2018

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

Shen Chen C Chu Chen C Geng Yini Y Jin Jiahua J Chen Fei F Shi Lei L

PloS one 20180216 2

Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player ...[more]

PMID: 29451899

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Project description:Across a variety of contexts, adults tend to cooperate more with ingroup members than outgroup members. However, humans belong to multiple social groups simultaneously and we know little about how this cross-categorization affects cooperative decision-making. Nationality and gender are two social categories that are ripe for exploration in this regard: They regularly intersect in the real world and we know that each affects cooperation in isolation. Here we explore two hypotheses concerning the effects of cross-categorization on cooperative decision-making. First, the additivity hypothesis (H1), which proposes that the effects of social categories are additive, suggesting that people will be most likely to cooperate with partners who are nationality and gender ingroup members. Second, the category dominance hypothesis (H2), which proposes that one category will outcompete the other in driving decision-making, suggesting that either nationality or gender information will be privileged in cooperative contexts. Secondarily, we test whether identification with-and implicit bias toward-nationality and gender categories predict decision-making. Indian and US Americans (N = 479), made decisions in two cooperative contexts-the Dictator and Prisoner's Dilemma Games-when paired with partners of all four social categories: Indian women and men, and US American women and men. Nationality exerted a stronger influence than gender: people shared and cooperated more with own-nationality partners and believed that own-nationality partners would be more cooperative. Both identification with-and implicit preferences for-own-nationality, led to more sharing in the Dictator Game. Our findings are most consistent with H2, suggesting that when presented simultaneously, nationality, but not gender, exerts an important influence on cooperative decision-making. Our study highlights the importance of testing cooperation in more realistic intergroup contexts, ones in which multiple social categories are in play.

Project description:Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals' characteristics, such as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact of these characteristics is, as the subjects of study are generally randomly paired, generating a heterogeneous mix of the two characteristics. In this study we ex-ante create four different groups of subjects by factoring their higher or lower than the median scores in both altruism and reasoning ability. Then we use these groups in order to analyze the joint effect of the two characteristics on the individual choice of cooperating and on successful paired cooperation. Subjects belonging to each group play first 10 one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with ten random partners and then three consecutive 10-round repeated PD games with three random partners. In all games, we elicit players' beliefs regarding cooperation using an incentive compatible method. Individuals with high altruism are more optimistic about the cooperative behavior of the other player in the one-shot game. They also show higher individual cooperation and paired cooperation rates in the first repetitions of this game. Contrary to the one-shot PD games where high reasoning ability reduces the probability of playing cooperatively, the sign of the relationship is inverted in the first repeated PD game, showing that high reasoning ability individuals better adjust their behavior to the characteristics of the game they are playing. In this sense, the joint effect of reasoning ability and altruism is not linear, with reasoning ability counteracting the cooperative effect of altruism in the one-shot game and reinforcing it in the first repeated game. However, experience playing the repeated PD games takes over the two individual characteristics in explaining individual and paired cooperation. Thus, in a (PD) setting, altruism and reasoning ability significantly affect behavior in single encounters, while in repeated interactions individual and paired cooperation reach similarly high levels independently of these individual characteristics.

Dataset Information

Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

Publications

Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

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