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Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation.

ABSTRACT: Voluntary participation, demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to promote persistent cooperative behavior, has been extensively studied. It has also been verified that the aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule promotes the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by this well-known fact, we combine the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn updating rule with voluntary participation: Players maintain their strategies when they are satisfied, or players attempt to imitate the strategy of one randomly chosen neighbor. We find that this mechanism maintains persistent cooperative behavior, even further promotes the evolution of cooperation under certain conditions.

SUBMITTER: Chu C

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5300200 | biostudies-literature | 2017

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation.

Chu Chen C Liu Jinzhuo J Shen Chen C Jin Jiahua J Shi Lei L

PloS one 20170209 2

Voluntary participation, demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to promote persistent cooperative behavior, has been extensively studied. It has also been verified that the aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule promotes the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by this well-known fact, we combine the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn updating rule with voluntary participation: Players maintain their strategies when they are satisfied, or players attempt to imitate the strategy ...[more]

PMID: 28182707

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