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Cooperation in an Assortative Matching Prisoners Dilemma Experiment with Pro-Social Dummies.

ABSTRACT: Assortative matching (AM) can be theoretically an effective means to facilitate cooperation. We designed a controlled lab experiment with three treatments on multi-round prisoner's dilemma. With matching based on weighted history (WH) as surrogate for AM, we show that adding pro-social dummies to the WH treatment may significantly improve cooperation, compared to both the random matching and the WH treatment. In society where assortative matching is effective and promoted by the underlying culture, institutional promotion of virtue role models can be interpreted as generating additional pro-social dummies, so as to move the initial state of cooperators into the basin of attraction for a highly cooperative polymorphic equilibrium.

SUBMITTER: Yang CL

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6754460 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Cooperation in an Assortative Matching Prisoners Dilemma Experiment with Pro-Social Dummies.

Yang Chun-Lei CL Yue Ching-Syang Jack CJ

Scientific reports 20190920 1

Assortative matching (AM) can be theoretically an effective means to facilitate cooperation. We designed a controlled lab experiment with three treatments on multi-round prisoner's dilemma. With matching based on weighted history (WH) as surrogate for AM, we show that adding pro-social dummies to the WH treatment may significantly improve cooperation, compared to both the random matching and the WH treatment. In society where assortative matching is effective and promoted by the underlying cultu ...[more]

PMID: 31541168

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