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Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.

ABSTRACT: OBJECTIVE:Analyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol). METHODS:Review of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods. RESULTS:Facing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade. CONCLUSION:Governments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

SUBMITTER: Crosbie E

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6639151 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.

Crosbie Eric E Bialous Stella S Glantz Stanton A SA

Tobacco control 20190118 e2

<h4>Objective</h4>Analyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).<h4>Methods</h4>Review of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.<h4>Results</h4>Facing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address ...[more]

PMID: 30659106

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Project description:BackgroundFollowing a legal agreement with the European Union (EU), Philip Morris International (PMI) commissions a yearly report ('Project Star', PS) on the European illicit cigarette trade from KPMG, the global accountancy firm.MethodsReview of PS 2010 report. Comparison with data from independent sources including a 2010 pan-European survey (N=18,056).FindingsWithin PS, data covering all 27 EU countries are entered into a model. While the model itself seems appropriate, concerns are identified with the methodologies underlying the data inputs and thus their quality: there is little transparency over methodologies; interview data underestimate legal non-domestic product partly by failing to account for legal cross-border sales; illicit cigarette estimates rely on tobacco industry empty pack surveys which may overestimate illicit; and there is an over-reliance on data supplied by PMI with inadequate external validation. Thus, PMI sales data are validated using PMI smoking prevalence estimates, yet PMI is unable to provide sales (shipment) data for the Greek islands and its prevalence estimates differ grossly from independent data. Consequently, comparisons with independent data suggest PS will tend to overestimate illicit cigarette levels particularly where cross-border shopping is frequent (Austria, Finland, France) and in Western compared with Eastern European countries. The model also provides data on the nature of the illicit cigarette market independent of seizure data suggesting that almost a quarter of the illicit cigarette market in 2010 comprised PMI's own brands compared with just 5% counterfeited PMI brands; a finding hidden in PMI's public representation of the data.ConclusionsPS overestimates illicit cigarette levels in some European countries and suggests PMI's supply chain control is inadequate. Its publication serves the interests of PMI over those of the EU and its member states. PS requires greater transparency, external scrutiny and use of independent data.

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Project description:While exposure to hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)) has been associated with increased lung cancer risk for more than 50 years, the chemical is not currently regulated by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on the basis of its carcinogenicity. The agency was petitioned in 1993 and sued in 1997 and 2002 to lower the workplace Cr(VI) exposure limit, resulting in a court order to issue a final standard by February 2006. Faced with the threat of stronger regulation, the chromium industry initiated an effort to challenge the scientific evidence supporting a more protective standard. This effort included the use of "product defense" consultants to conduct post hoc analyses of a publicly-funded study to challenge results viewed unfavorably by the industry. The industry also commissioned a study of the mortality experience of workers at four low-exposure chromium plants, but did not make the results available to OSHA in a timely manner, despite multiple agency requests for precisely these sorts of data. The commissioned study found a statistically significant elevation in lung cancer risk among Cr(VI)-exposed workers at levels far below the current standard. This finding changed when the multi-plant cohort was divided into two statistically underpowered components and then published separately. The findings of the first paper published have been used by the chromium industry to attempt to slow OSHA's standard setting process. The second paper was withheld from OSHA until it was accepted for publication in a scientific journal, after the rulemaking record had closed. Studies funded by private sponsors that seek to influence public regulatory proceedings should be subject to the same access and reporting provisions as those applied to publicly funded science. Parties in regulatory proceedings should be required to disclose whether the studies were performed by researchers who had the right to present their findings without the sponsor's consent or influence, and to certify that all relevant data have been submitted to the public record, whether published or not.

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Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.

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Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.

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