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Biosecurity risks posed by a large sea-going passenger vessel: challenges of terrestrial arthropod species detection and eradication.

ABSTRACT: Large sea-going passenger vessels can pose a high biosecurity risk. The risk posed by marine species is well documented, but rarely the risk posed by terrestrial arthropods. We conducted the longest running, most extensive monitoring program of terrestrial arthropods undertaken on board a passenger vessel. Surveillance was conducted over a 19-month period on a large passenger (cruise) vessel that originated in the Baltic Sea (Estonia). The vessel was used as an accommodation facility to house workers at Barrow Island (Australia) for 15 months, during which 73,061 terrestrial arthropods (222 species - four non-indigenous (NIS) to Australia) were collected and identified on board. Detection of Tribolium destructor Uytt., a high-risk NIS to Australia, triggered an eradication effort on the vessel. This effort totalled more than 13,700 human hours and included strict biosecurity protocols to ensure that this and other non-indigenous species (NIS) were not spread from the vessel to Barrow Island or mainland Australia. Our data demonstrate that despite the difficulties of biosecurity on large vessels, stringent protocols can stop NIS spreading from vessels, even where vessel-wide eradication is not possible. We highlight the difficulties associated with detecting and eradicating NIS on large vessels and provide the first detailed list of species that inhabit a vessel of this kind.

SUBMITTER: McKirdy SJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6920439 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Biosecurity risks posed by a large sea-going passenger vessel: challenges of terrestrial arthropod species detection and eradication.

McKirdy Simon J SJ O'Connor Simon S Thomas Melissa L ML Horton Kristin L KL Williams Angus A Hardie Darryl D Coupland Grey T GT van der Merwe Johann J

Scientific reports 20191218 1

Large sea-going passenger vessels can pose a high biosecurity risk. The risk posed by marine species is well documented, but rarely the risk posed by terrestrial arthropods. We conducted the longest running, most extensive monitoring program of terrestrial arthropods undertaken on board a passenger vessel. Surveillance was conducted over a 19-month period on a large passenger (cruise) vessel that originated in the Baltic Sea (Estonia). The vessel was used as an accommodation facility to house wo ...[more]

PMID: 31852943

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Project description:Vaccine platforms have been critical for accelerating the timeline of COVID-19 vaccine development. Faster vaccine timelines demand further development of these technologies. Currently investigated platform approaches include virally vectored and RNA-based vaccines, as well as DNA vaccines and recombinant protein expression system platforms, each featuring different advantages and challenges. Viral vector-based and DNA vaccines in particular have received a large share of research funding to date. Platform vaccine technologies may feature dual-use potential through informing or enabling pathogen engineering, which may raise the risk for the occurrence of deliberate, anthropogenic biological events. Research on virally vectored vaccines exhibits relatively high dual-use potential for two reasons. First, development of virally vectored vaccines may generate insights of particular dual-use concern such as techniques for circumventing pre-existing anti-vector immunity. Second, while the amount of work on viral vectors for gene therapy exceeds that for vaccine research, work on virally vectored vaccines may increase the number of individuals capable of engineering viruses of particular concern, such as ones closely related to smallpox. Other platform vaccine approaches, such as RNA vaccines, feature relatively little dual-use potential. The biosecurity risk associated with platform advancement may be minimised by focusing preferentially on circumventing anti-vector immunity with non-genetic rather than genetic modifications, using vectors that are not based on viruses pathogenic to humans, or preferential investment into promising RNA-based vaccine approaches. To reduce the risk of anthropogenic pandemics, structures for the governance of biotechnology and life science research with dual-use potential need to be reworked. Scientists outside of the pathogen research community, for instance those who work on viral vectors or oncolytic viruses, need to become more aware of the dual-use risks associated with their research. Both public and private research-funding bodies need to prioritise the evaluation and reduction of biosecurity risks.

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Dataset Information

Biosecurity risks posed by a large sea-going passenger vessel: challenges of terrestrial arthropod species detection and eradication.

Publications

Biosecurity risks posed by a large sea-going passenger vessel: challenges of terrestrial arthropod species detection and eradication.

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