Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Kim M
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8242928 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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