A novel framework of classical and quantum prisoner's dilemma games on coupled networks.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Deng X
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4792163 | biostudies-other | 2016 Mar
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other
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Project description:It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.
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Project description:Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called "zero-determinant" strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows "extortioners" to ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in coevolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called "Red King" effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.
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Project description:Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
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Project description:Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.
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Project description:It is not fully understood why we cooperate with strangers on a daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction networks and relationships between individuals are becoming more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and to account for the true motivations that are behind this phenomenon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to foster cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism have yielded contradictory results so far; additionally, the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large systems. We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma on a lattice and a scale-free network (1,229 subjects). We observed that the level of cooperation reached in both networks is the same, comparable with the level of cooperation of smaller networks or unstructured populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the cooperation that they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to cooperate if, in the previous round, many of their neighbors and themselves did so, which implies that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma but only their actions. Our results, which are in agreement with recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans.
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Project description:To function during social interactions, we must be able to consider and coordinate our actions with other people's perspectives. This process unfolds from decision-making, to anticipation of that decision's consequences, to feedback about those consequences, in what can be described as a "cascade" of three phases. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) task, an economic-exchange game used to illustrate how people achieve stable cooperation over repeated interactions, provides a framework for examining this "social decision cascade". In the present study, we examined neural activity associated with the three phases of the cascade, which can be isolated during iPD game rounds. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 31 adult participants made a) decisions about whether to cooperate with a co-player for a monetary reward, b) anticipated the co-player's decision, and then c) learned the co-player's decision. Across all three phases, participants recruited the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), regions implicated in numerous facets of social reasoning such as perspective-taking and the judgement of intentions. Additionally, a common distributed neural network underlies both decision-making and feedback appraisal; however, differences were identified in the magnitude of recruitment between both phases. Furthermore, there was limited evidence that anticipation following the decision to defect evoked a neural signature that is distinct from the signature of anticipation following the decision to cooperate. This study is the first to delineate the neural substrates of the entire social decision cascade in the context of the iPD game.
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Project description:As tumors outgrow their blood supply and become oxygen deprived, they switch to less energetically efficient but oxygen-independent anaerobic glucose metabolism. However, cancer cells maintain glycolytic phenotype even in the areas of ample oxygen supply (Warburg effect). It has been hypothesized that the competitive advantage that glycolytic cells get over aerobic cells is achieved through secretion of lactic acid, which is a by-product of glycolysis. It creates acidic microenvironment around the tumor that can be toxic to normal somatic cells. This interaction can be seen as a prisoner's dilemma: from the point of view of metabolic payoffs, it is better for cells to cooperate and become better competitors but neither cell has an incentive to unilaterally change its metabolic strategy. In this paper a novel mathematical technique, which allows reducing an otherwise infinitely dimensional system to low dimensionality, is used to demonstrate that changing the environment can take the cells out of this equilibrium and that it is cooperation that can in fact lead to the cell population committing evolutionary suicide.
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Project description:Cooperative behavior, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a wide spread phenomenon. Here we study direct reciprocity in the context of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. We consider all strategies that can be implemented by one and two-state automata. We calculate the payoff matrix of all pairwise encounters in the presence of noise. We explore deterministic selection dynamics with and without mutation. Using different error rates and payoff values, we observe convergence to a small number of distinct equilibria. Two of them are uncooperative strict Nash equilibria representing always-defect (ALLD) and Grim. The third equilibrium is mixed and represents a cooperative alliance of several strategies, dominated by a strategy which we call Forgiver. Forgiver cooperates whenever the opponent has cooperated; it defects once when the opponent has defected, but subsequently Forgiver attempts to re-establish cooperation even if the opponent has defected again. Forgiver is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, but the alliance, which it rules, is asymptotically stable. For a wide range of parameter values the most commonly observed outcome is convergence to the mixed equilibrium, dominated by Forgiver. Our results show that although forgiving might incur a short-term loss it can lead to a long-term gain. Forgiveness facilitates stable cooperation in the presence of exploitation and noise.
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Project description:BackgroundThe neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin have been repeatedly implicated in social decision making by enhancing social salience and, generally, cooperation. The iterated and sequential version of the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a social dilemma paradigm eliciting strategies of cooperation versus competition.AimsWe aimed to characterise the role of PD players' sex, game partner type (computer vs. human) and oxytocin or vasopressin inhalation on the player's strategy preference.MethodsParticipants (153 men; 151 women) were randomised to intranasal 24 IU oxytocin, 20 IU vasopressin or placebo, double-blind, and played the PD. We examined main and interactive effects of sex, drug and partner type on strategy preference.ResultsWe found a pervasive preference for a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. general sensitivity to the partner's choices) over unconditional cooperation, particularly when against a human rather than a computer partner. Oxytocin doubled this sensitivity in women (i.e. the preference for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation strategies) when playing against computers, which suggests a tendency to anthropomorphise them, and doubled women's unconditional cooperation preference when playing against humans. Vasopressin doubled sensitivity to the partner's previous choices (i.e. for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation) across sexes and partner types.ConclusionsThese findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to oxytocin's social effects of anthropomorphism of non-humans and of unconditional cooperation with humans, which may be consistent with evolutionary pressures for maternal care, and that vasopressin, irrespective of sex and partner type, may be generally sensitising humans to others' behaviour.
| S-EPMC7583454 | biostudies-literature