Dataset Information

Vaccination and testing of the border workforce for COVID-19 and risk of community outbreaks: a modelling study.

ABSTRACT: Throughout 2020 and the first part of 2021, Australia and New Zealand have followed a COVID-19 elimination strategy. Both countries require overseas arrivals to quarantine in government-managed facilities at the border. In both countries, community outbreaks of COVID-19 have been started via infection of a border worker. This workforce is rightly being prioritized for vaccination. However, although vaccines are highly effective in preventing disease, their effectiveness in preventing infection with and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is less certain. There is a danger that vaccination could prevent symptoms of COVID-19 but not prevent transmission. Here, we use a stochastic model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and testing to investigate the effect that vaccination of border workers has on the risk of an outbreak in an unvaccinated community. We simulate the model starting with a single infected border worker and measure the number of people who are infected before the first case is detected by testing. We show that if a vaccine reduces transmission by 50%, vaccination of border workers increases the risk of a major outbreak from around 7% per seed case to around 9% per seed case. The lower the vaccine effectiveness against transmission, the higher the risk. The increase in risk as a result of vaccination can be mitigated by increasing the frequency of routine testing for high-exposure vaccinated groups.

SUBMITTER: Plank MJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8479330 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Vaccination and testing of the border workforce for COVID-19 and risk of community outbreaks: a modelling study.

Plank Michael J MJ Binny Rachelle N RN Hendy Shaun C SC Lustig Audrey A Ridings Kannan K

Royal Society open science 20210929 9

Throughout 2020 and the first part of 2021, Australia and New Zealand have followed a COVID-19 elimination strategy. Both countries require overseas arrivals to quarantine in government-managed facilities at the border. In both countries, community outbreaks of COVID-19 have been started via infection of a border worker. This workforce is rightly being prioritized for vaccination. However, although vaccines are highly effective in preventing disease, their effectiveness in preventing infection w ...[more]

PMID: 34631122

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Project description:ObjectivesUniversities are exploring strategies to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 prior to reopening their campuses. National guidelines do not currently recommend testing students prior to campus arrival. However, the impact of presemester testing has not been studied.DesignDynamic SARS-CoV-2 transmission models are used to explore the effects of three presemester testing interventions.InterventionsTesting of students 0, 1 and 2 times prior to campus arrival.Primary outcomesNumber of active infections and time until isolation bed capacity is reached.SettingWe set on-campus and off-campus populations to 7500 and 17 500 students, respectively. We assumed 2% prevalence of active cases at the semester start, and that one-third of infected students will be detected and isolated throughout the semester. Isolation bed capacity was set at 500. We varied disease transmission rates (R0=1.5, 2, 3, 4) to represent the effectiveness of mitigation strategies throughout the semester.ResultsWithout presemester screening, peak number of active infections ranged from 4114 under effective mitigation strategies (R0=1.5) to 10 481 under ineffective mitigation strategies (R0=4), and exhausted isolation bed capacity within 10 (R 0 =4) to 25 days (R0=1.5). Mandating at least one test prior to campus arrival delayed the timing and reduced the size of the peak, while delaying the time until isolation bed capacity was reached. Testing twice in conjunction with effective mitigation strategies (R0=1.5) was the only scenario that did not exhaust isolation bed capacity during the semester.ConclusionsPresemester screening is necessary to avert early and large surges of active COVID-19 infections. Therefore, we recommend testing within 1 week prior to and on campus return. While this strategy is sufficient for delaying the timing of the peak outbreak, presemester testing would need to be implemented in conjunction with effective mitigation strategies to significantly reduce outbreak size and preserve isolation bed capacity.

Project description:BackgroundResidents of prisons have experienced disproportionate COVID-19-related health harms. To control outbreaks, many prisons in the USA restricted in-person activities, which are now resuming even as viral variants proliferate. This study aims to use mathematical modelling to assess the risks and harms of COVID-19 outbreaks in prisons under a range of policies, including resumption of activities.MethodsWe obtained daily resident-level data for all California state prisons from Jan 1, 2020, to May 15, 2021, describing prison layouts, housing status, sociodemographic and health characteristics, participation in activities, and COVID-19 testing, infection, and vaccination status. We developed a transmission-dynamic stochastic microsimulation parameterised by the California data and published literature. After an initial infection is introduced to a prison, the model evaluates the effect of various policy scenarios on infections and hospitalisations over 200 days. Scenarios vary by vaccine coverage, baseline immunity (0%, 25%, or 50%), resumption of activities, and use of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that reduce transmission by 75%. We simulated five prison types that differ by residential layout and demographics, and estimated outcomes with and without repeated infection introductions over the 200 days.FindingsIf a viral variant is introduced into a prison that has resumed pre-2020 contact levels, has moderate vaccine coverage (ranging from 36% to 76% among residents, dependent on age, with 40% coverage for staff), and has no baseline immunity, 23-74% of residents are expected to be infected over 200 days. High vaccination coverage (90%) coupled with NPIs reduces cumulative infections to 2-54%. Even in prisons with low room occupancies (ie, no more than two occupants) and low levels of cumulative infections (ie, <10%), hospitalisation risks are substantial when these prisons house medically vulnerable populations. Risks of large outbreaks (>20% of residents infected) are substantially higher if infections are repeatedly introduced.InterpretationBalancing benefits of resuming activities against risks of outbreaks presents challenging trade-offs. After achieving high vaccine coverage, prisons with mostly one-to-two-person cells that have higher baseline immunity from previous outbreaks can resume in-person activities with low risk of a widespread new outbreak, provided they maintain widespread NPIs, continue testing, and take measures to protect the medically vulnerable.FundingHorowitz Family Foundation, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Science Foundation, Open Society Foundation, Advanced Micro Devices.

Dataset Information

Vaccination and testing of the border workforce for COVID-19 and risk of community outbreaks: a modelling study.

Publications

Vaccination and testing of the border workforce for COVID-19 and risk of community outbreaks: a modelling study.

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